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Abstract
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has been adopted by the US National Security
Agency (NSA) in Suite “B” as part of its “Cryptographic Modernisation Program ”. Ad-
ditionally, it has been favoured by an entire host of mobile devices due to its superior
performance characteristics. ECC is also the building block on which the exciting field
of pairing/identity based cryptography is based. This widespread use means that there is
potentially a lot to be gained by researching efficient implementations on modern proces-
sors such as IBM’s Cell Broadband Engine and Philip’s next generation smart card cores.
ECC operations can be thought of as a pyramid of building blocks, from instructions on a
core, modular operations on a finite field, point addition & doubling, elliptic curve scalar
multiplication to application level protocols.
In this thesis we examine an implementation of these components for ECC focusing on a
range of optimising techniques for the Cell’s SPU and the MIPS smart card. We show
significant performance improvements that can be achieved through of adoption of ECC.
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In the landscape of extinction,
precision is next to godliness.
Samuel Beckett 1
Preface
In this thesis we review a selection of the numerous public key cryptographic algorithms
and demonstrate how they can be optimised by capitalising on improvements in modern
processor design.
In Chapter 2, we commence by performing a review of public key cryptography. We
continue by reviewing the mathematics behind the best-known techniques. In Chapter 3 we
discuss design considerations when implementing cryptographic pairings inside a modern
smart card. In Chapter 4 we outline work undertaken to identify pairing friendly curves
using super-computing resources. In Chapter 5 we review the design of the Cell Broadband
Engine. In Chapter 6 we outline performance gains for SSL achieved by utilising a specialist
multi-core processor. Finally in Chapters 7 and 8 we describe techniques used to achieve
speed records when using Elliptic Curve Cryptography on a synergistic processor.
2
2
Crypto 101
This chapter outlines the background to the mathematics of cryptography, details a num-
ber of the standard algorithms, multi-precision arithmetic, and evolves to a description of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
2.1 Cryptographic concepts
As a background to cryptography and an introduction to security protocols, we would like
to provide an historic example of an algorithm called the Caesar Cipher attributed to Julius
Caesar the 1st Roman Emperor from 61BC to 44BC. The algorithm is a very simple but
effective example of the principles involved in the encryption of messages.
In the Caesar cipher the algorithm is a simple symbol swap. All the letters of the
alphabet A through W are substituted with the character three places after it in sequence,
with X, Y and Z been represented by A, B, C. Hence A is represented by D, N by Q etc.
For example the message “ATTACK GAUL ” can be encoded to “DWWDFN JDXO”. A
simple backward step of subtracting 3 places lets one arrive at the original message. This
is a crude cipher on which the success of keeping the content secret depends on the casual
observer having no knowledge of the algorithm (the simple alphabet switch) and the offset
(3). Simple improvements include having a jumbled up alphabet (A=B, B=Z, C=N etc.)
as a look-up table with both sides knowing the new lookup table and possibly having an
3
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increment on the offset in some formula also agreed by the participants. The fundamentals
of modern cryptography build on these simple ideas of message, algorithm and key.
Messages can be transformed to numbers via simple ASCII (American Standard Code
for Information Interchange) representation of the characters making up the message. This
is where each character/letter of the message is represented by a well known number (a=97,
b=98, z= 122 etc.) and in computers these numbers are represent by binary (1 or 0) bits.
Operations which transform these ASCII numbers are equivalent to transforming the
original message they represent. There are other methods of cryptography but the math-
ematical methods described below are believed to be the strongest. Modern cryptography
relies upon the mathematics of making transformation operations, which are hard to invert,
even when one knows the transformation used. For example the well known RSA method
which is based on the difficulty of integer factorisation, or the El Gamal method which is
based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem.
2.2 Some building blocks used in Modern Cryptography.
2.2.1 Modular arithmetic
Modular arithmetic deals with a set of integers where if N is positive then the numbers
modulo N are the set of numbers ∀ i | 0 ≤ i < N . If two numbers have the same remainder
when divided by the modulo N then we say they are congruent modulo N .
An everyday example of modular arithmetic is the set of hours on a clock
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 mod 12. So if it is two o’clock and we add three hours it is
five o’clock as it will also be in fifteen plus two hours
(15 + 2 mod 12 = 5).
Two of the most popular public key algorithms use modular exponentiation as their
underlying mathematical process.
2.2.2 Prime numbers
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines a prime as follows:
4
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Prime \’prim\ n [ME, fr. MF, fem. of prin first, L primus;
akin to L prior] 1 : first in time : ORIGINAL 2 a :
having no factor except itself and one <3 is a ~ number> b :
having no common factor except one <12 and 25 are relatively ~> 3 a :
first in rank, authority or significance : PRINCIPAL b :
having the highest quality or value <~ television time>
Simply put, a prime is a number that has exactly two positive integer factors, 1 and
itself.
Eratosthenes (275-194 B.C., Greece) devised a ‘sieve‘ to discover prime numbers. Using
this method to find all the prime numbers first write down all the positive whole numbers.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 etc.
Then you take away all the number that are multiples of 2 , then all the numbers that
are multiples of 3, then 4, 5, 6, 7 and so on (numbers known as composite numbers).
The numbers that are left are prime numbers.
2 3 5 7
11 13 17 19
23 29
31 37 etc.
Prime numbers have fascinated mathematicians for centuries. The problem is no one
has yet determined a method to predict the sequence of prime numbers. The only known
method is brute force (exhaustive search) i.e going through all possibilities. Picking a
number large enough brings us to primes that are usable in cryptography.
2.2.3 Chinese Remainder Theorem
The ancient (4th century AD) Chinese mathematician Sun-Tsu solved the problem of iden-
tifying those integers x that leave remainders 2, 3 and 2 when divided by 3, 5, and 7. One
5
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solution is x = 23, and all solutions are of the form 23 + 105k for arbitrary integers k [26].
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) expressed in terms of integers modulo m.
x ≡ r1(mod m1)
x ≡ r2(mod m2)
x ≡ r3(mod m3)
...
x ≡ rn(mod mn)
then there is a unique solution X, for x lying between 0 and m1 m2 m3 ... mn, and the
general solution is congruent to X (mod m1 m2 m3 ... mn).
Let
P =
n∏
i=1
mi
and, for all i ∈ N (1 ≤ i ≤ n), let yi be an integer that satisfies
yi · P
mi
≡ 1 (mod mi)
Then one solution of these congruences is
x0 =
n∑
i=1
aiyi · P
mi
Any x ∈ Z satisfies the set of congruences if and only if it satisfies
x ≡ x0 (mod P )
Used by the ancient Chinese to count large numbers of troops, one use of the CRT is
to do arithmetic on large numbers by choosing a set of moduli m1 m2 m3 ... mn and then
treating each number as a set of remainders r1 r2 r3 ... rn rather than a sequence of digits.
Subsequently one does the arithmetic and recovers the solutions by using the CRT [97].
6
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2.2.4 Groups
A group is a set of numbers with an operator. This is a relatively simple group to illustrate
the properties useful for cryptography. The numbers 1 to 4 and an operator being multiply
×.
[×, 1, 2, 3, 4 mod 5]
The group is closed when the answer is always within the group
(3 × 2) = 6 mod 5 = 1
The group has an identity which is a number which when applied by the operator does not
change the element.
2× 1 = 2
It is associative
(2× 3)× 4 = 2× (3× 4) mod 5
Every element has an inverse
(3× 2) = 6 = 1 mod 5
A group is cyclic if it has a member that when subjected to repeated applications of the
operator will give every member of the set
2 = 2 mod 5 = 2
2× 2 = 4 mod 5 = 4
2× 2× 2 = 8 mod 5 = 3
2× 2× 2× 2 = 16 mod 5 = 1
7
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In order to identify how many times to apply the operator to get 3, one must simply keep
applying it -a method known as exhaustive search.
2× 2× 2 = 3 mod 5
This is relatively simple since this group has 4 members. The groups that we use have
approximately 2512 elements. So the approach outlined would be too time consuming.
Therefore the determination of x given 2x in the group is very difficult.
The point here is that applying the operation N times is easy. Finding out how many
times the operation was applied is computationally too expensive. This is a one way func-
tion.
y = gx mod p
The formula can be used to generate elements of the group over the field Fq. In this
context g can be described as the generator of the group. The number of elements in the
group will be a divisor of p− 1. In our example 2 is a generator of the group of order 4 over
F5.
2.3 Types of cryptography
There are two main types of mathematical cryptography
• Symmetric or secret key
• Asymmetric or public key
2.3.1 Symmetric Key
Symmetric key is a relatively easy concept to understand. Essentially one party (the en-
cryptor) uses a secret key to a mathematical function which encrypts the plaintext message
to a secure form. The message is passed to the decrypter who uses the same key to apply
8
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Figure 2.1: Symmetric Key (source [33])
an inverse mathematical function which decrypts the message returning it to its original
plaintext. The principal issue in symmetric cryptography is the secure transport of the key
between the parties. Examples include DES, IDEA, & AES.
2.3.2 Asymmetric Key
Background
Asymmetric key cryptography is a more complex concept to grasp but is generally more
useful for application level security. The key is broken up into two parts known as the public
key and the private key. The public key is used to encrypt the message and the private key
to decrypt. Asymmetric is popularly known as public key cryptography.
The original discovery of methods suitable for public key cryptography have traditionally
been attributed to Diffie, Hellman & Merke in 1977, more commonly known as the Diffie-
Hellman [32] method. However in 1997 history has corrected itself with the declassification
of papers from the British secret services which lay claim to the fact the James Ellis probably
9
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Figure 2.2: Asymmetric Key (source [33])
invented and that Clifford Cocks probably discovered a method for public key cryptography
long before Diffie et al. But, suitable to persons working inside the intelligence services,
they kept the claim to themselves. GCHQ (now CESG [18]) have since backed up their
claims with documentary evidence [35]. The American equivalent (NSA) have claimed an
even earlier idea but evidence is scant. Background to this interesting story is in Wired
magazine [62] where Diffie (a colorful character in his own right) visits a retired Ellis and
brings him to a pub in England attempting to prise the real story out of him. Ellis is too
humble (and clever !) and leaves Diffie none the wiser but doubtful of his own place in
history.
Technical
Asymmetric key protocols are commonly based on the one-way function.
y = gx mod p where p is a prime.
10
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Assume g and p are public. Then given x finding y is easy. However given y to find x is
assumed to be very hard. This is based upon the fact that certain problems are intractable.
The issues with the above equation (also written as x = logg(y)) is known as the discrete
logarithm problem (DLP). Based on this we can build asymmetric key encryption. The
function looks simple and it would seem that with a simple try every x or brute force attack
would yield y. However, for acceptable levels of protection to make such an attack unfeasible
it is required to use a p with at least 1024 bits and the exponent x with at least 160 bits.
The size of p is referred to as the field size, and x as the group order size. The field
size is so much larger than the order size as index-calculus methods exist for solving the
discrete logarithm problem, which require a relatively large field size to resist. There are
faster methods than brute force search (for example so called “square root methods” like the
Pollard rho and Pollard Lambda algorithms), but they are still computationally infeasible
for numbers of cryptographic size.
As an alternative to the one way function a “hard problem” exists on an Elliptic Curve.
y = x3 +Ax+B mod p
Take a point on the curve P (x, y). Then assume P is used as a public group generator.
Y = xP
This also represents a strong one-way function. If we know x then calculating Y is
easy. However given Y finding x is difficult. This is basically the same Discrete Logarithm
problem. The advantage of using Elliptic Curves is that index calculus methods used to
attack the modular equation are not known and hence both the field and order sizes can be
as low as 160 bits for practical security. This lower bit size reduces computation overhead
and allows for efficient use in restricted devices such as mobile phones or smart cards.
The advantage of all this asymmetric cryptography lies with the property that pos-
sessing the public key provides little clue to the private key allowing the public key to be
freely published to allow anyone to encrypt to the holder of the private key. This unique
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property overcomes the limitations of symmetric cryptography which requires prior “key
swapping” before use. However this advantage comes with a performance penalty. Asym-
metric algorithms are significantly more computationally expensive than symmetric and
are not suitable to encrypt large amounts of data taking too long a time for real-time data
communications such as a Virtual Private Network (VPN) or an email system.
The solution is to use another more efficient algorithm such as a symmetric algorithm
to perform the bulk data encryption and use the public key methods to encrypt the key(s)
and transport them with (usually by simply attaching them to) the encrypted data. This
hybrid solution is used by most common protocols such as SSL, SSH, IpSec and S/Mime.
For practical purposes a combination of the two methods provides both practical per-
formance together with ease of use.
2.4 Commonly used asymmetric algorithms
2.4.1 RSA
Background
Discovered in 1977 and named after its inventors, Ron Rivest [78], Adi Shamir and Leonard
Adleman, RSA [76] encryption is based on the difficulty of the integer factorisation problem,
and transforms the message M into the number C
C = M e mod N
The numbers e and N are the two public numbers created and published. They are your
public key. As before the message M can be simply the digital value of a block of ASCII
characters.
The formula states: multiply the Message M by itself e times, then divide the result by
the number N and save only the remainder. The remainder that we have called C is the
encrypted representation of the message.
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Example Application
Alice publishes the public key numbers e = 29 and N = 77. Bob wants to send Al-
ice the message “I have it”. In decimal ASCII the message is 73321049711810132105116.
Break this number string into smaller blocks less then N as per the following
73 32 10 49 71 18 10 13 21 05 11 6
To encrypt these blocks, apply the formula
C = M e(mod N)
to each block.
Technical Overview
Here we present a description due to Mao [63]
As before we deal with Bob attempting to send a message to Alice.
Key Set-up.
Alice creates her public and private key pair thus
1. Choose two large random prime numbers p and q such that | p |<| q |
2. Compute N = pq
3. Compute φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
4. Choose a random integer e < φ(N) such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1 and compute the
integer d such that ed ≡ 1(mod (φ(N)))
5. Publicise (N, e) as her public key, discarding p, q and φ(N) and keeping d as her
private key. e can be small but d must be impossible to guess.
To encrypt to Alice
To send a message M < N to Alice, the sender Bob creates a ciphertext C by
13
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C ←M e(mod N)
For Alice to decrypt
To read the ciphertext C from Bob, Alice computes
M ← Cd(mod N)
Efficient decryption
The Chinese remainder theorem 2.2.3 can be used to yield efficient algorithms for RSA
decryption and can be more efficient (in terms of bit operations) than working modulo N .
2.4.2 ECC
Background
Another form of “hard problem” that mathematicians have found useful to the field of
cryptography is that of Elliptic Curves.
The discovery of the use of Elliptic Curves for public key cryptography can be attributed
independently to Neil Koblitz [58] and Victor Miller [68] who both made discoveries in 1985.
Technical Overview
Note: Curves can be defined in Affine (2 dimensions) or Projective (3 dimensions co-
ordinates) - The equations we present are in Affine co-ordinates.
To follow general cryptographic convention we use curves of the form
y2 = x3 + a× x+ b mod p
This means we are only allowed to use the integers from zero to p− 1 as input.
For example let us take an equation with p = 11, a = 4 and b = 7.
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Figure 2.3: Elliptic Curve
y2 = x3 + 4x+ 7 mod 11
The group of points of interest are those with (x, y) coordinates which satisfy this equa-
tion, plus the point at infinity (denoted by O).
To add two points on a curve, it is not possible to simply add the coordinates to find a
point which still satisfies the curve equation.
However there are a set of rules which one can apply for curves of this type.
The rules are (see Smart [91])
• Rule 1: O +O = O
• Rule 2: (x1, y1) +O = (x1, y1)
• Rule 3: (x1, y1) + (x1,−y1) = O
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• Rule 4: if x1 6= x2, (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) = (x3, y3) where
x3 = (β
2 − x1 − x2) mod p
y3 = (β(x1 − x3)− y1) mod p
β = ((y2 − y1)/(x2 − x1)) mod p.
• Rule 5: if y1 6= 0, (x1, y1) + (x1, y1) = 2(x1, y1) = (x3, y3) where
x3 = (β2 − 2x1) mod p
y3 = (β(x1 − x3)− y1) mod p
β = ((3x21 + a)/(2y1)) mod
We recommend Nigel Smart’s “Introduction to Cryptography” [91], Wenbo Mao’s “Modern
Cryptography” [63] Menezes “Elliptic Curve Cryptography” [66].
Applying these rules, two points on the curve may be added to yield a third point also
on the curve. For example in the figure above point P + Q = (P +Q) on the curve.
Note 1 : : Should we detect, in our calculations, a divide by zero we can stop and say
the result is the point at infinity (O).
Note 2 : The point at infinity (O) acts like zero in regular addition : Add a point to the
point at infinity we get the original point. This is the additive identity for the group.
Note 3. Prime Modulus. The group is cyclic, it has a generator function such that
when this function is applied to any member of the group, it will only result in another
member of the group. If applied to all members of the group then it will produce another
set containing all members of the original group. Interestingly the output sequence of the
results of the application of the generator is random. See [96].
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Figure 2.4: Point Addition . (source [64])
Note 4 : Multiplication
Take a point P an (x, y) point and multiply it by an integer d. dP is d× P and we can
break down d× P to (P + P + ...P ) i.e. P added to itself d times. Then apply the rules of
addition. In the illustrated figure 3P = P + P + P .
This integer d is called a scalar as opposed to the coordinate (point) P .
What does all this mean to cryptography ?
We take an elliptic curve (i.e. modulus p and parameters a and b) and a point on this curve
P .
Then, take a scalar d and find dP to get another point on the curve Q.
We keep d secret. We can use the curve (p, a, b) and points P,Q as the public key. The
challenge for any attacker is to find d. No-one has found a sub-exponential algorithm to be
able to compute d. This is another manifestation of the discrete logarithm problem.
If the modulus p is large enough (200 bits or so) then it would take today’s supercom-
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Figure 2.5: 2× P , 3× P source [64])
puters several thousands of years. This is the basis for the application to cryptography.
Scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve is relatively easy, but the inverse, which is
extremely hard.
To illustrate we will consider Key agreement using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.
Diffie-Hellman is a technique to allow unauthenticated key agreement using exponentia-
tion. The security rests on the intractability of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem
and the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
• Alice calculates her curve and makes p, a, b and a point P public.
• She generates some random da and keeps this secret.
• Alice sends Bob Qa which is equal to daP .
• Bob gets Alice’s public components and generates his own random db.
• He calculates Qb by computing dbP .
• Bob then computes a secret value S = dbQa.
• Since Qa is just daP what Bob has computed is S = dbdaP .
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• He sends Alice Qb and Alice uses this to compute her secret value S = daQb.
• Since Qb is dbP , what Alice has done is to compute S = dadbP this is the same as
Bob computed.
So Alice and Bob can “secretly” get to the same point on the curve S, by using this
protocol. A simple method to extract a key is just to ignore the y coordinate and take
the x coordinate as a number. This derived number can be used as a key. Bob can use
this secret value to make an AES encryption key. Alice can use the method outlined above
to get the same encryption key. So what Bob encrypts, Alice can decrypt. The Attacker
Eve intercepting this exchange just knows p, a, b, P,Qa, and Qb. The only way for Eve to
determine S is to get either da or db which Alice and Bob are holding secret.
To get d calculate one of the d’s by using the fact that she knows either
Qa = daP and she knows Qa and P
OR
Qb = dbP and she knows Qb and P .
This is exactly the discrete logarithm problem of ECC as outlined above.
ECC key size and RSA key size
The main stumbling block to the wide spread usage of public key cryptography is the com-
putational overhead of traditional PKC based on RSA. ECC supports equivalent security
levels with less computational overhead. ECC has smaller key sizes and signatures. ECC is
often used in mobile, embedded, and sensor networks for its power characteristics. For more
material on ECC the reader is referred to [45] and [13]. The US standards body (NIST)
has issued guidelines for equivalent key length usage
2.4.3 Pairings
Joux [55] and Sakai, Ohgishi & Kasahara [82] independently proposed using properties of
pairing-mapping functions applied to cryptography to establish ID-based PKI. Initially the
area of pairings had been discounted as holding no promise for cryptographic applications.
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ECC key size RSA key size Key size AES key size
bits bits ratio bits
163 1024 1:6
256 3072 1:12 128
384 7680 1:20 192
512 15360 1:30 256
Table 2.1: NIST guidelines for public key sizes for AES
It wasn’t until the Joux publication [55] that countered this claim that this whole area was
opened to researchers culminating with Boneh & Franklin’s much publicised paper in 2001.
Let G1 and G2 denote two groups of prime order q, where G1, with an additive notation,
denotes the group of points on an elliptic curve; and G2, with a multiplicative notation,
denotes a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite field.
Multiplicative groups will be represented here as Z∗n, which is the set of positive integers
less than n and relatively prime to n under multiplication modulo n. An integer is relatively
prime to another if their only common positive divisor is 1. For example, 8 and 15 , though
not prime numbers, are relatively prime.
A pairing is a computable bilinear map between these two groups. Two pairings have
been studied for cryptographic use. They are the Weil1 pairing and the Tate pairing .
For the purposes of discussion, we let eˆ denote a general bilinear map, i.e. eˆ:G1×G1 → G2,
which can be either a modified Weil pairing or a Tate pairing.
In this notation the Diffie-Hellman (DH) solution described above is a tuple in G1 as
(P, xP, yP, zP )→ G1 for some x, y, z (chosen at random) → Zq∗
satisfying z = xy mod q.
Properties of Pairings
Bilinear: If P, P1, P2, Q,Q1, Q2 ∈ G1 and a ∈ Z∗q , then eˆ(P1 + P2, Q) = eˆ(P1, Q).eˆ(P2, Q),
and eˆ(P,Q1 +Q2) = eˆ(P,Q1).eˆ(P,Q2).
Non-degenerate: There exists a P ∈ G1 such that eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1.
1Pronounced “Vay”. Andre Weil in the 1940’s.
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Computable: If P,Q ∈ G1, one can compute eˆ(P,Q) in polynomial time.
Since pairings were discovered, new protocols for identity-based encryption [14], [81],
short signatures [15] and identity-based signcryption [65]. We do not attempt to provide a
complete history here, but instead refer the interested reader to the Pairing-based Crypto
Lounge [7].
2.4.4 Pairing-friendly elliptic curves
When it comes to the selection of elliptic curves suitable for pairing-based cryptography, one
is currently limited to either the supersingular curves or certain special non-supersingular
curves of prime characteristic. A basic requirement is that the selected elliptic curve should
have a small embedding degree, or security multiplier, denoted as k. In this chapter, it will
be assumed that k is even.
If the curve was defined over a finite field of size q, G is mapped to a subgroup of a
finite field of size qk for some integer k. The smallest such integer k is called the embedding
degree.
Therefore, for cryptographic purposes a pairing-friendly elliptic curve over a finite field
consists of the finite set of points (including a point at infinity) on a curve which can be
described by one of
E(Fpm) : y2 = x3 +Ax+B
E(F2m) : y2 + y = x3 + x+ b
E(F3m) : y2 = x3 − x+ b
In the first case, the curve can be either supersingular, with an embedding degree of
k = 2, or nonsupersingular with m = 1 and any finite embedding degree [13]. In the second
case, the curve is supersingular and has a maximum embedding degree of k = 4, where
b = 0, 1. In the third case, the curve is also supersingular with a maximum embedding
degree of k = 6, and where b = ±1.
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As is common in elliptic curve cryptography over E(Fq), one wants to work with a group
of points of prime order r, where r | q+1−t the total number of points on the curve (denoted
#E), and where t is the trace of the Frobenius, with |t| 6 2√q (the Hasse condition) [66].
These points then form a prime order cyclic abelian group. This group size needs to be large
enough to avoid various generic attacks on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and
therefore, at a minimum, r should be 160-bits. The embedding degree k is related to this
group of points on the elliptic curve by the condition that k is the smallest positive integer
such that r | (qk − 1). A further security requirement for these elliptic curves is that Fqk ,
where q = p, 2m or 3m, should be an extension field of sufficient size to prevent an index
calculus attack on the discrete logarithm problem in that field. So, at a minimum, k. lg(q)
should be 1024 bits.
We therefore have the interesting constraints that r can, at most, be approximately
as big as q (due to the Hasse condition), with lg(r) a minimum of 160, and that k. lg(q)
should then be at least 1024. One obvious feasible solution would be to choose lg(r) ≈ 170,
r = q+ 1− t, and k = 6 so that 6. lg(q) ≈ 1024. This explains the early popularity of curves
of characteristic 3 with k = 6. This also has the advantage of keeping the size of the elliptic
curve as small as those required for standard ECC while still attaining the minimum levels
of index calculus security. However, another valid and popular choice would be to use a
supersingular [14] or non-supersingular curve [85] over Fp, with lg(r) = 160, lg(p) = 512
and k = 2.
In the case of fields of low characteristic, the security situation is rather unclear. As first
pointed out by Coppersmith [25], the discrete logarithm problem in F2m is somewhat easier
than it is over a prime characteristic field. According to the current record holder [95], who
was able to calculate discrete logarithms for m = 607, it would require m ≈ 1200 to obtain
a greater level of security than 1024-bit RSA. Interpolating into the tables provided by
Lenstra [60] would suggest that 1300 bits would be sufficient. Page, Smart and Vercauten
[75] have since observed that the record for prime field discrete logarithms is 398 bits [61],
607/398 = 1.53.
A pairing is denoted as e(P,Q), where P is taken as a point of order r, usually on E(Fq),
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and Q is a point on E(Fqk) linearly independent of P . The pairing evaluates naturally as
an element of order r in Fqk . Its most important cryptographic property is its bilinearity
e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab
If Q should be linearly dependent on P and P ∈ E(Fq), then the pairing is degenerate
and e(P,Q) = 1, and thus, for example, e(P, P ) = 1. On a supersingular curve, it is
usual to exploit the existence of a distortion map ψ(.) that maps a point from E(Fq) to a
linearly independent point on E(Fqk). Now both P and Q can be linearly dependent points
from the same group of order r on E(Fq) and the distorted pairing can be calculated as
eˆ(P,Q) = e(P,ψ(Q)). This pairing has the additional, and sometimes useful, property that
eˆ(P,Q) = eˆ(Q,P ), which is implied by the condition that eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1.
2.5 Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
In 1984, Shamir [88] (the ‘S’ in RSA) proposed the first identity-based signature scheme
and outlined a solution to this key distribution / certificate management problem calling it
Identity Based Encryption (IBE). However, he didn’t have an implementation.
The idea was that if any string can be a public key, then one could use an identifier of
the recipient to be the public key in which case one doesn’t need to locate the public key
associated with an identity. The identity is the key. Furthermore, one can use the “identifier
string” combined with something like a date/time and encrypt messages to be read into the
future.
Our friends Alice and Bob are to communicate in this system. Bob can simply use Alice’s
email address (alice@wonderland.com) and the public parameters of a trusted third party
as the public key to encrypt the message. When Alice receives the message, she contacts
the trusted third party (KDC key distribution center), validates herself and receives the
private key associated with her identity.
Shamir’s proposed IBE remained an elusive “holy grail” for cryptographers until Cocks
[22] working at the British secret service GCHQ discovered a method relying on quadratic
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residues. Unfortunately this method is impractical for widespread use because of the band-
width overheads. It has recently come to light that two Japanese researchers Sakai and
Kasahara [81] also made a significant discovery relevant to IBE using pairings but due to
language barriers their implementation wasn’t widely known.
In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [14] announced a more viable method using the Weil pairing
(See. 2.4.3) This method, while demonstrable, still lacked a pragmatic implementation
which could be considered widely usable. Optimizations of the pairing mathematics were
proposed by Barreto-Kim-Lynn-Scott [2] in 2002 which moved the processing overheads
close to that of the widely used RSA algorithm. These optimizations involved
• Point tripling for super-singular elliptic curves over F3m .
• Removal of irrelevant operations from conventional algorithms.
Background
An IBE system involves, using the language of Boneh & Franklin’s seminal paper 2 a set of
four algorithms.
Setup: A key generator (KDC) which runs a ‘setup’ algorithm to generate global system
parameters and a master-key which the KDC keep safe. The whole security of the
system relies on the safekeeping of this master-key in a device sich as a hardware
security module.
Extract: The KDC runs an extract algorithm inputting the user’s identity (or any bit
string) and using the master-key from the setup. The output is the users private-key
associated with the users identity. Its important that the private-key is transported
to the user in a safe manner and that the KDC has made a full examination of the
user credentials before issuing a key corresponding to those credentials.
Encrypt: A probabilistic algorithm. Any user encrypts using the global system parameters
and public key ID. The output is the ciphertext.
2Extended abstract in [14]
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Decrypt: This process takes the ciphertext from the encrypt function, global system pa-
rameters and the private key issued by the KDC. The output is the corresponding
plaintext.
Boneh & Franklin’s paper provides a random oracle security proof for their IBE method.
Hence, it is secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack assuming the hardness of
the so-called Bilinear Diffie Hellman problem.
Technical
The following description is from Mao [63].
Set-up
1. Generate two groups G1,G2 of prime order q and a mapping-in-pair e : G12 → G2.
choose P and element in G1.
2. Pick s ∈∪ Zq and set Ppub ← [s]P ; s is the master key.
3. Using a strong hash algorithm F : {0, 1}∗ → G1. to map the identity string ID to an
element in G1.
4. Specify another suitable hash algorithm H : G2 → {0, 1}n.
The KDC keeps s as the system master-key and publishes the parameters.
(G1,G2, e, n, P, Ppub, F,H)
Private Key Generation (= Extract)
Let ID denote an authenticated and validated user’s identity (it can be any string)
1. Compute QID ← F (ID). This is an element in G1 and is the users public key.
2. Set the users private key dID as [s]QID.
Encryption
To send an encrypted message, obtain the system parameters (G1,G2, e, n, P, Ppub, F,H).
Using them, compute QID = F (ID). To encrypt M ∈ {0, 1}n pick r ∈U Zq and compute
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gID ← e(QID, [r]Ppub) ∈ G2,
The ciphertext is C ← ([r]P,M⊕H(gID)).
Decryption
To decrypt C using ID’s private key dID as [s]QID, compute M = V
⊕
H(e(dID, U)).
Other “hard problems”
As mentioned above the Diffie-Hellman (DH) tuple in G1 is a tuple (P, xP, yP, zP ) ∈ G41
for some x, y, z chosen at random from Zq satisfying z = xy mod q.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given the first three elements in
a DH tuple, compute the remaining element. The CDH assumption: no algorithm
exists running in expected polynomial time which can solve the CDH problem with
non-negligible probability.
Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem: Given a tuple (P, xP, yP, zP ) ∈ G41 for
some x, y, z chosen at random from Zq, decide if it is a valid DH tuple. If a pairing
can be calculated then this can be solved in polynomial time by verifying the equation
eˆ(xP, yP ) = eˆ(P, zP ).. Note that this is contrast to the situation in the simple finite
field where the DDH problem is also complex. This is also difficult on an elliptic curve
if a pairing cannot be calculated; that is if the elliptic curve is not pairing-friendly.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem: Let P be a generator of G1. The BDH
problem in G1,G2, eˆ is given (P, xP, yP, zP ) ∈ G41 for some x, y, z chosen at random
from Zq, compute W = eˆ(P, P )xyz ∈ G2.
The following description of multi-precision algorithms is primarily derived from the
Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Cryptography ([23] Chapters 10 and 11), and the
Handbook of Applied Cryptography ([67] Chapter 14). However, it is equally well presented
in Crandall ([27] Chapter 9), Smart ([91] Chapter 11 Section 11.5), and Rodr´ıguez-Henr´ıquez
et al ([79] Chapter 5).
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2.6 Integer representation
The fundamental mathematical layer of most cryptographic systems is the integer ring Z
([23] Chapter 10). On top of the integer ring, it is possible to build finite fields then
elliptic curves and other sets. Efficient elliptic curve implementations therefore rely on
implementing efficient integer arithmetic. General purpose computers can only operate on
relatively small integers. In order to facilitate the large integers required by cryptography,
we need to build special representation (multi-precision) on top of the basic integer types.
Then we need to use efficient algorithms for arithmetic using these multi-precision integers.
Let b ≥ 2 be an integer called the base or the radix. Every integer u > 0 can be written
in a unique way as the sum
u = un−1bn−1 + ...+ u1b+ u0
provided 0 ≤ ui < b and un−1 6= 0. This is what is known as the b representation of u and
is denoted by (un−1...u0)b. The ui’s are the digits of u.
This representation is generally present in high-level programming languages as a data
structure wrapping an array of base-type integers. However, no standards exist for these
data structures so small differences in subtle areas, such as ordering or padding, cause
interoperability problems. See Chapter 6 Section 6.2 and Chapter 7 Section 7.1.2 for further
discussion on multi-precision toolkits and internal representation.
2.6.1 Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (ECDH)
Let F be a finite field and E/F an elliptic curve defined over F. Let E(F) denote the group
of F-rational points on E. For any P ∈ E(F) and k ∈ Z we will denote the k-th scalar
multiple of P as [k]P .
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [32] can now be carried out in the group
〈P 〉 ⊆ E(F) as follows: User A chooses a random a ∈ {2, . . . , |〈P 〉| − 1}, computes [a]P and
sends this to user B. User B chooses a random b ∈ {2, . . . , |〈P 〉| − 1}, computes [b]P and
sends this to user A. Now both users can compute Q = [a]([b]P ) = [b]([a]P ) = [(a · b)]P .
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The joint key for secret key cryptography is then extracted from Q; a common way to do
this is to compute a hash value of the x-coordinate of Q.
2.6.2 Montgomery arithmetic
For elliptic curves defined by an equation of the form By2 = x3 + Ax2 + x, Montgomery
introduced in [72] a fast method to compute the x-coordinate of a point R = P +Q, given
the x-coordinates of two points P and Q and the x-coordinate of their difference P −Q.
These formulas lead to an efficient algorithm to compute the x-coordinate of Q = [k]P
for any point P . This algorithm is often referred to as the Montgomery ladder. In this
algorithm the x-coordinate xP of a point P is represented as (XP , ZP ), where xP = XP /ZP ;
for the representation of the point at infinity see the discussion in Appendix B of [9]. See
Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 for a pseudocode description of the Montgomery ladder.
Algorithm 2.1 The Montgomery ladder for x-coordinate-based scalar multiplication on
the elliptic curve E : By2 = x3 +Ax2 + x
Input: A scalar 0 ≤ k ∈ Z and the x-coordinate xP of some point P
Output: (X[k]P , Z[k]P ) fulfilling x[k]P = X[k]P /Z[k]P
t = dlog2 k + 1e
X1 = xP ; X2 = 1; Z2 = 0; X3 = xP ; Z3 = 1
for i← t− 1 downto 0 do
if bit i of k is 1 then
(X3, Z3, X2, Z2)← ladderstep(X1, X3, Z3, X2, Z2)
else
(X2, Z2, X3, Z3)← ladderstep(X1, X2, Z2, X3, Z3)
end if
end for
return (X2, Z2)
Each ‘ladder step‘ as described in Algorithm 2.2 requires 5 multiplications, 4 squarings,
8 additions and one multiplication with the constant a24 = (A + 2)/4 in the underlying
finite field.
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Algorithm 2.2 One ladder step of the Montgomery ladder
const a24 = (A+ 2)/4 (A from the curve equation)
function ladderstep(XQ−P , XP , ZP , XQ, ZQ)
t1 ← XP + ZP
t6 ← t21
t2 ← XP − ZP
t7 ← t22
t5 ← t6 − t7
t3 ← XQ + ZQ
t4 ← XQ − ZQ
t8 ← t4 · t1
t9 ← t3 · t2
XP+Q ← (t8 + t9)2
ZP+Q ← XQ−P · (t8 − t9)2
X[2]P ← t6 · t7
Z[2]P ← t5 · (t7 + a24 · t5)
return (X[2]P , Z[2]P , XP+Q, ZP+Q)
end function
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Implementing Cryptographic Pairings on
Smartcards
Background
Smart cards have been used for many different purposes over the last two decades, from
simple prepaid credit counter cards used in parking meters, to high security identity cards
intended for national ID programs. Their wide spread use in banking cards and GSM/3G
mobile phones has possibly made them the most common form of computing device on the
planet. One of the overriding design criteria for a smart cards is to keep them low cost. The
various cards look similar as the physical interfaces are defined by a simple ISO standard.
Under the hood only the most expensive models have processors and storage which allow
for the computation required for public key cryptography. Cards designed for security
applications tend to have relatively expensive, tamper resistant, dedicated cryptographic
co-processors whose design tends to be limited to a small set of algorithms. That said, the
form factor and secure execution environments make smart cards the ideal identity token.
For Identity based encryption to gain wide spread acceptance it was essential that pairings
be seen to work inside these constrained devices.
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3.1 Introduction
Pairings on elliptic curves are fast coming of age as cryptographic primitives for deployment
in new security applications, particularly in the context of implementations of Identity-
Based Encryption (IBE). In this chapter we describe the implementation of various pairings
on a contemporary 32-bit smart-card, the Philips HiPerSmartTM, an instantiation of the
MIPS-32 based SmartMIPSTM architecture. Three types of pairing are considered, first the
standard Tate pairing on a nonsupersingular curve E(Fp), second the Ate pairing, also on a
nonsupersingular curve E(Fp), and finally the ηT pairing on a supersingular curve E(F2m).
We demonstrate that pairings can be calculated as efficiently as classic cryptographic prim-
itives on this architecture, with a calculation time of as little as 0.15 seconds.
The appreciation that the Weil and Tate pairings can be used for constructive cryptographic
application has caused a minor revolution in cryptography. After a flurry of research results
involving new protocols based on new but plausible security assumptions, it is time for the
first commercial applications to start appearing. The final, and perhaps most demanding,
niche for the implementation of many cryptographic protocols is in the smart-card, a con-
strained computing environment in which private keys can be adequately protected. It is
the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate that such implementations are perfectly feasible.
There have been two previous reported implementations of pairings on smartcards, the
first in the form of an announcement by Gemplus (Now Gemalto) [41], and the second in
a paper by Bertoni et al. [11]. There have also been proposals for implementations, such
as that by Granger et al. [43], which would require special supporting hardware. Bertoni
et al. report a timing of 752 milliseconds on a 33MHz ST22 32-bit smartcard [11], for the
same level of security as considered here.
As our chosen smart-card has special support for multiprecision arithmetic over Fp, and
over F2m , we will restrict our attention here to these two cases, although the field F3m has
undoubted advantages (with its nice embedding degree k = 6) and has received considerable
attention in the context of pairing based cryptography [43].
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3.2 The SmartMIPSTM architecture
The SmartMIPSTM specification is of an instruction-set enhanced version of the popular
RISC MIPS32 architecture The enhancements are designed to improve the performance
of popular cryptographic algorithms, and are largely those envisaged and described by
Großscha¨dl and Savas [44]. It is interesting to note that this new generation of 32-bit
smartcards do not employ a classic cryptographic co-processor, with its restricted and spe-
cialised set of operations, but rather use carefully selected instruction set enhancements,
which when combined with the improved overall performance of the 32-bit chip, permit
standard cryptographic algorithms to be executed with sufficient speed. It is also fortu-
nately flexible enough to efficiently support new algorithms that were not envisaged when
the processor was being designed.
The main idea is that an extended ACX|HI|LO triple of registers can be used to accu-
mulate the partial products that arise when employing the popular Comba/Montgomery
technique for multi-precision multiplication [44]. This is supported by a modified MADDU
instruction which carries out an unsigned integer multiplication and addition to the triple
register. Another important addition to the instruction set is the inclusion of a MADDP in-
struction which supports binary polynomial multiplication, and which therefore supports
field multiplication over F2m . For many years algorithms over this field have been disad-
vantaged with respect to the field Fp by the absence of such an instruction in standard
processors. The addition of this instruction finally “levels the playing field”, and allows the
full potential of fast arithmetic over the field F2m to be realised.
One disadvantage of the MIPS architecture for multi-precision integer arithmetic is the
lack of a carry flag, and specifically an add-with-carry ADC instruction. In fact it takes 5
instructions just to process one digit in a multi-precision integer addition in order to handle
the carry-in and carry-out correctly, not including memory loads and stores. Note however
that this is not an issue in F2m as in this context addition is carry-free.
When considering the performance of any processor the CPU performance equation [46]
is relevant
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CPU Time =
Number of Instructions× Average Clocks Per Instruction
Clock Speed in cycles per second
As instantiated by the Philips HiPerSmartTM our targeted processor is characterised by
• A five stage pipeline
• Maximum clock speed of 36MHz
• 2k Instruction cache
• 256k Flash memory
• 16k RAM memory
Figure 3.1: Philips HiPerSmart Development Rig
One of the most significant attributes from a programming point of view is the small
size of the 2-way associative instruction cache. The MIPS processor as described in [46] is
very much designed as a classic RISC processor, which can benefit enormously from loop-
unrolling as is indeed the default behaviour of GCC -O3 compiler optimization. However
this is entirely inappropriate with such a small instruction cache. Cache misses are very
expensive, and are the main reason for increased CPI (Clocks-Per-Instruction), leading to
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poorer performance. Ruthless loop unrolling can dramatically decrease overall instruction
count, but only at the cost of much poorer CPI.
While the majority of instructions can complete one pipeline stage per clock tick, certain
combinations of instructions will cause a stall in the pipeline. Most of these stalls can be
identified and avoided by instruction scheduling (re-ordering). A typical cause for such a
stall might be the latency of a multiply instruction like MADDU. However as pointed out in
[44] these potential performance hits can be avoided if we use the right algorithm. While
such pipeline stalls increase CPI, they do so in a fashion which is independent of the clock
speed. Cache capacity misses must happen given the small size of the cache, and furthermore
conflict misses are inevitable given that the cache is only 2-way associative. These cache
misses exact a cost in wasted cycles which can increase dramatically with clock speed, as
the access time of main memory becomes much slower than the 1-cycle access time of a
cache hit.
3.3 Calculating the Pairing
We consider the scenario in which a smart-card is required to carry out IBE decryption, using
either the IBE method of Boneh and Franklin [14] or the method of Sakai and Kasahara
as described in [19]. In both cases the critical calculation to recover the plaintext is of
the pairing e(A,B), where A is the recipient’s private and constant key, and B is a public
and variable value associated with the ciphertext. For provable chosen ciphertext security
an additional point multiplication is required in both cases, but this is multiplication of a
constant point and so fast methods can be used. We omit a formal description of either
scheme and instead refer the interested reader to the referenced material.
Much effort has been made to optimize the Tate pairing. In this work we will describe an
implementation of the pairing over a prime order finite field Fp using the BKLS algorithm [2],
as described by Scott [85], an implementation of the Ate pairing [47], and an implementation
over the small characteristic field F2m using the ηT pairing approach described in [5]. In
all cases we will exploit the setting in which the pairing is to be calculated to maximize
34
CHAPTER 3. IMPLEMENTING CRYPTOGRAPHIC PAIRINGS ON SMARTCARDS
performance.
3.3.1 The BKLS pairing algorithm
All algorithms for calculating a pairing are elaborations and improvements of the basic Miller
algorithm [69]. This particular variation [2] has general applicability to pairing-friendly
elliptic curves E(Fp), either supersingular or non-supersingular. In this case we choose
to use an embedding degree of 2 with a non-supersingular curve, very much following the
description given in [85]. We use the same non-supersingular curve as described there, where
p is a 512-bit prime number and r is the low Hamming weight Solinas prime 2159 + 217 + 1.
The point Q is handled as a point on the twisted curve E′(Fp). Since p = 3 mod 4, elements
of the extension field Fp2 such as m can be described as mR+imI , where i is the“imaginary”
square root of the quadratic non-residue −1.
The helper function g(.) calculates the line functions required by Miller’s algorithm, and
returns a value in Fp2 . This function in turn requires a function A.add(B) which adds the
elliptic curve points A = A + B using standard methods, and returns the slope of the line
joining A and B.
Algorithm 3.1 Function g(.)
Input: A,B,Q
1: let A = (xi, yi), Q = (xQ, yQ)
2: λi = A.add(B)
3: return yi − λi(xQ + xi)− i.yQ
Algorithm 3.2 Computation of the Tate pairing e(P,Q) on E(Fp) : y2 = x3 + Ax + B
where P is a point of prime order r on E(Fp) and Q is a point on the twisted curve E′(Fp)
Input: P,Q
1: m = 1
2: A = P
3: n = r − 1
4: for i← blg(r)c − 1 downto 0 do
5: m = m2 · g(A,A,Q)
6: if ni = 1 then m = m · g(A,P,Q)
7: end for
8: m = m¯/m
9: return V(p+1)/r(mR)
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After the Miller loop, the value of m needs to be subject to a final exponentiation to
the power of (p − 1)(p + 1)/r. This is done in two parts – first we calculate mp−1 using
a conjugation and a division, and then we use a Lucas sequence to raise this value to the
power of (p+ 1)/r. The returned value is thus compressed to a single element in Fp [86].
Observe that the parameter P is in effect being multiplied by its group order r using
a standard double-and-add method. The points generated as a result of this process (the
xi and yi in the g(.) function), and the associated line slopes λi, can be precalculated and
stored if P is a constant, which it will be in the context under consideration here – in fact
its the IBE private key of the card-holder.
Therefore we will precompute and store the points (xi, yi, λi) that arise in the mul-
tiplication of P by r. This results in a much simplified algorithm, where the expensive
A.add(B) function is no longer required and curve points can be represented using simple
affine coordinates.
3.3.2 The Ate pairing algorithm
The Ate pairing [47] is calculated faster than the Tate pairing over non-supersingular curves
E(Fp) if lg(t)/ lg(r) is less than one, as it uses a truncated Miller loop of length lg(t) instead
of lg(r) as required above. It was once considered “natural” when implementing the Tate
pairing on non-supersingular curves with embedding degree k ≥ 4, that the first parameter
P should be on the the curve defined over the base field E(Fp) and that the second parameter
Q should be a point on a twist of the curve E′(Fpk/d), where d can always be 2 [4], but
can be as high as 6 for certain curves, such as the BN curves [6]. The authors of [47]
however observed that, rather counter-intuitively, the Ate pairing idea works best with P
on E′(Fpk/d) and Q on E(Fp). In our application this swapping of roles is not an important
issue, as P will be fixed and its multiples can be precalculated and stored as above. More
important is the fact that we can get away with a possibly much shorter Miller loop, and
still calculate a viable bilinear pairing.
To exploit the Ate pairing we first need a family of elliptic curves which have the required
properties. Not only must they be pairing-friendly, but to get the full advantage we want
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lg(t) < lg(r). The best that can be hoped for is that lg(t)/ lg(r) = 1/ deg(Φk(x)), where
Φk(x) is the k-th cyclotomic polynomial [47]. So for a k = 12 curve such as that described
in [3], the loop may be shortened to as little as one-quarter size. However for our targeted
level of security, k = 12 is too big. Consider instead the family of elliptic curves defined by
x = (Dz2 − 3)/4, t = x+ 1, r = x2 + 1
p = (x3 + 13x2 + 26x+ 13)/25, #E = ((x+ 13)r)/25
It can easily be verified that these parameters define a family of pairing-friendly elliptic
curve with embedding degree k = 4, and with complex multiplication by −D. Note that
r = Φ4(x), and that lg(t)/ lg(r) = 0.5 which is optimal, and so we can leverage the maximum
advantage from the Ate pairing idea with a half-length loop. The actual parameters of a
curve in the form y2 = x3 + Ax + B can then be found using the method of complex
multiplication [54]. By choosing random z such that p is prime and 256 bits in length, then
we can easily find a value for r which has a 160-bit prime divisor. In this way the conditions
that k. lg(p) = 1024 and lg(r) = 160 can be satisfied. For our particular curve, t − 1 has
a relatively low Hamming weight of 31, and the discriminant D = 259. The full algorithm
can now be given
Algorithm 3.3 Function g(.)
Input: A,B,Q
1: let A = (xi, yi), Q = (xQ, yQ)
2: λi = A.add(B)
3: return i2yQ − i(i2yi/2 + λi(i2xi/2 + xQ))
In this case the function g(.) returns a value in Fp4 and the Ate pairing returns a
compressed value in Fp2 . Since we choose p = 5 mod 8, −2 is a quadratic non-residue in Fp
and
√−2 is a quadratic non-residue in Fp2 , elements in Fp4 can be represented as a pair of
elements in Fp2 , m = mR + imI with i = (−2)1/4 [73]. In the function g(.), points on the
twisted curve E′(Fp2) must first be converted to coordinates on E(Fp4), which explains the
apparent complexity of this function. However given that these can all be precalculated,
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Algorithm 3.4 Computation of the Ate pairing a(P,Q) on E(Fp) : y2 = x3 + Ax + B
where P is a point of prime order r on the twisted curve E′(Fp2) and Q is a point on the
curve E(Fp)
Input: P,Q
1: m = 1
2: A = P
3: n = t− 1
4: for i← blg(n)c − 1 downto 0 do
5: m = m2 · g(A,A,Q)
6: if ni = 1 then m = m · g(A,P,Q)
7: end for
8: m = m¯/m
9: return V(p2+1)/r(mR)
this is not an issue in practice.
3.3.3 The BGOhES pairing algorithm
On the supersingular curve
E(F2m) : y2 + y = x3 + x+ 1
where m is prime and m = 3 mod 8, the number of points is 2m + 2(m+1)/2 + 1 [5]. For
our choice of m = 379, this value is a prime. A suitable irreducible polynomial for the field
F2379 is x379 + x315 + x301 + x287 + 1. This supersingular curve has an embedding degree
of k = 4. To represent the quartic extension field F24m , we use the irreducible polynomial
X4 +X + 1.
Recall that in a characteristic 2 field with a polynomial basis, field squarings are of linear
complexity. Furthermore on this supersingular curve, point doublings require only cheap
field squarings (using affine coordinates). Therefore we can anticipate that calculations on
this curve will be very efficient.
A distortion map for this particular supersingular curve is ψ(x, y) = (x+ s2.y+ sx+ t),
where t = X and s = X +X2 [66]. A major insight from [5] is that the Tate pairing can be
calculated from the more primitive ηT pairing, which requires a half-length loop compared
to the Duursma-Lee method [34], with considerable computational savings. The algorithm
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as described benefits from unrolling the loops times 2, in which case each iteration costs
just seven base field multiplications. The final exponentiation looks a little complex, but
in fact can be accomplished with only 4 extension field multiplications, (m + 1)/2 cheap
extension field squarings and some nearly-free Frobenius operations.
Algorithm 3.5 Computation of eˆ(P,Q) on E(F2m) : y2 + y = x3 + x+ b : m ≡ 3 (mod 8)
case
Input: P,Q
Output: eˆ(P,Q)
1: let P = (xP , yP ), Q = (xQ, yQ)
2: u← xP + 1
3: f ← u · (xP + xQ + 1) + yP + yQ + b+ 1 + (u+ xQ)s+ t
4: for i← 1 to (m+ 1)/2 do
5: u← xP , xP ← √xP , yP ← √yP
6: g ← u · (xP + xQ) + yP + yQ + xP + (u+ xQ)s+ t
7: f ← f · g
8: xQ ← x2Q, yQ ← y2Q
9: end for
10: return f (2
2m−1)(2m−2(m+1)/2)+1)(2(m+1)/2+1)
Since P will be fixed, all the square roots in this algorithm can be precalculated and
stored with some savings. With this modification, our implementation is largely the same
as that described in [5].
3.4 Implementation Issues
Our implementation makes use of the MIRACL multiprecision library [84]. This library
is friendly towards those attempting implementations in a constrained environment, like a
smartcard. Typically a big number library forces allocation of memory for big variables
from the heap. In a constrained environment however a heap is a luxury that often cannot
be afforded. Therefore allocation from the stack is appropriate. Header file definitions were
used to cut down the amount of code required. This was supplemented with some manual
pruning of unwanted functionality.
For optimal performance MIRACL includes a mechanism for generating unrolled Comba
code for modular multiplication, squaring, and reduction with respect to a fixed modulus,
including specific support for the SmartMIPSTM processor. However as pointed out above,
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fully unrolled code is inappropriate in an environment where the instruction cache is very
small. Therefore we found it necessary to take the automatically generated (and correct)
code, and to roll it up again into tight loops, much as described in [44]. Extra manually
written inline assembly code was provided to support fast squaring in F2m using the MADDP
instruction, and short unrolled assembly language code was provided for fast field addition
in F2m . With these exceptions, the rest of the code was written in standard C.
Precomputation was used to advantage in all cases. The amount of ROM required to
store precomputed values was 31232, 25036 and 18432 bytes respectively, for the Tate, Ate
and ηT pairing. The RAM requirement in all cases was comfortably with 16K available,
typically requiring only half of that. As stack memory is inherently re-usable, a simple
restructuring of the programs could reduce this requirement still further.
3.5 Results
We present our results in a series of tables. As well as the timings for the pairings, we
include timings for (non-fixed) point multiplications and pairing exponentiations, these
as often relevant to pairing based protocols. For each of the three implementations we
assume projective coordinates are used for point multiplication, as field inversions which are
required for affine point addition are very slow on the smartcard. The point multiplication
is taken over the base field E(Fq) using a random 160-bit multiplier. Field exponentiation
is of the pairing value to a random 160-bit exponent. For the E(Fp) cases we use Lucas
exponentiation (also known as a “Montgomery powering ladder”) of the compressed pairing,
while for the E(F2379) case we use standard windowed exponentiation, as we believe these
to be the fastest methods in each case.
Our hardware emulator is only cycle accurate up to 20.57MHz, and so we estimate
the timings for the maximum supported speed of 36MHz, using linear interpolation for
CPI. For comparision purposes we include figures for 1024-bit RSA decryption (using the
Chinese Remainder Theorem), and timings on a standard PC (note that these are faster
than previously reported timings, due to their implementation in C rather than C++).
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Table 3.1: Instructions required ( % icache misses) - Philips HiPerSmartTM
E(F2379) ηT pairing E(Fp) Tate pairing E(Fp) Ate pairing
Pairing 3705344 (10.9%) 7753341 (7.3%) 8156645 (15.8%)
Point Mult. 2589569 (9.6%) 7418768 (6.1%) 2663217 (17.5%)
Field exp. 1551117 (11.4%) 1364124 (7.2%) 1614016 (15.7%)
RSA decryption 4372772 (3.4%)
Table 3.2: Clock cycles required/CPI/time in seconds @ 9 MHz
E(F2379) ηT pairing E(Fp) Tate pairing E(Fp) Ate pairing
Pairing 4311454/1.16/0.48 9104450/1.17/1.01 10860479/1.33/1.21
Point Mult. 3118344/1.20/0.35 8529176/1.15/0.95 3739596/1.40/0.42
Field exp. 1924596/1.24/0.21 1593313/1.17/0.18 2122221/1.31/0.24
RSA decryption 4740271/1.08/0.53
Table 3.3: Clock cycles required/CPI/time in seconds @ 20.57 MHz
E(F2379) ηT pairing E(Fp) Tate pairing E(Fp) Ate pairing
Pairing 4590712/1.24/0.22 9755457/1.26/0.47 12207440/1.50/0.59
Point Mult. 3391127/1.31/0.16 9049457/1.22/0.44 4278858/1.61/0.21
Field exp. 2118707/1.37/0.10 1705365/1.25/0.08 2374885/1.47/0.12
RSA decryption 4880323/1.12/0.24
Table 3.4: Clock cycles required/CPI/time in seconds @ 36MHz (estimated)
E(F2379) ηT pairing E(Fp) Tate pairing E(Fp) Ate pairing
Pairing 4891054/1.32/0.14 10467010/1.35/0.29 13621597/1.67/0.38
Point Mult. 3677188/1.42/0.10 9570210/1.29/0.27 4847055/1.82/0.13
Field exp. 2326675/1.50/0.06 1814285/1.33/0.05 2630846/1.63/0.07
RSA decryption 5072415/1.16/0.14
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Table 3.5: Timings in milliseconds on 3GHz Pentium IV
E(F2379) ηT pairing E(Fp) Tate pairing E(Fp) Ate pairing
Pairing 3.88 2.97 3.16
Point Mult. 1.82 3.08 1.17
Field exp. 1.14 0.54 0.62
RSA decryption 1.92
The most surprising and significant observation to be made is that the ηT pairing can
be calculated as quickly as a standard RSA decryption, for approximately the same level of
security. As expected CPI goes up as clock speed increases, as we are punished more heavily
for cache misses. This has less impact on algorithms that spend more time in tight loops,
and hence disadvantages the ηT and Ate pairings with their more elaborate structures and
higher extension fields. Note that RSA, due to its simplicity, suffers least from increasing
CPI.
3.6 Does pairing delegation make sense?
The idea of securely delegating the calculation of a pairing to the terminal was considered
in [20]. This was motivated by the assumption that the pairing calculation might be too
resource consuming to be carried out on a smartcard. Here we present a slightly modified
version of the method described in Section 6.2 of [20]. In the context of IBE decryption the
calculation of e(A,B) involves a constant and private A (in fact the IBE private key), and
a public B (in fact part of the ciphertext). It is assumed that the smartcard also has stored
a random secret point Q and the value of e(A,Q).
• The card generates random x,y,and z, and queries the following pairings to the ter-
minal.
α1 = e(x
−1A,B), α2 = e(yA, z(B +Q))
42
CHAPTER 3. IMPLEMENTING CRYPTOGRAPHIC PAIRINGS ON SMARTCARDS
• The card computes
eAB = α
x
1
• The card checks that
αr1 = 1, α
xyz mod r
1 = α2/e(A,Q)
yz mod r
If successful the protocol outputs e(A,B) = eAB. Observe that two of the point multi-
plications are of the fixed point A. These may be calculated oﬄine, or at the very least can
benefit from fast methods for fixed-point multiplication. Also e(A,Q)yz can be precalcu-
lated, or calculated using fixed-base exponentiation [67]. So the major online cost will be of
3 exponentiations and one point multiplication. From the tables above it is clear that the
ηT pairing is so fast that delegation is unlikely to be beneficial. The standard Tate pairing
(k = 2) implementation suffers badly as point multiplication is over a large 512-bit field.
However in the case of our Ate pairing implementation, with its smaller 256-bit field size,
it appears that delegation might be beneficial.
3.7 Conclusions
We have demonstrated for the first time that cryptographic pairings can be implemented
just as quickly as classic public key cryptographic operations on a standard smartcard,
hence clearing the way for their more widespread adoption. The issue of pairing delegation
has been investigated, and it appears that despite the efficiency of our implementations, it
may be advantageous in certain circumstances.
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Pairing Friendly Curves Search
4.1 Introduction
The work carried out for Chapter 3 left many major questions about how cryptographic
pairings would be used in practice. Many researchers developed protocols which assumed
an implementation “black box” that would be fast, robust, secure, and implement standards
akin to the Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) [80] or NIST standard curves (see
Section 7.1.4) for interoperability etc. However, it is early days with respect to the industrial
acceptance of pairing base cryptography.
In order to further the adoption of the field of pairing based cryptography, we attempted
to reduce the overhead for researchers by solving an open problem of locating pairing friendly
elliptic curves (Section 2.4.4) by systematically documenting all available curves in a wide
search space using super-computing resources. An open problem to its successful adoption
is the arbitrary selection of elliptic curves by different research teams, often without under-
standing critical security and/or performance issues associated with their choice. We tried
to produce the definitive list of known “friendly” curves for use by research and industry
worldwide. At the present time, finding even one such candidate “friendly” curve can take
a number of days on a standard PC. We used the computation power available at the “Irish
Centre for High-End Computing” (ICHEC) [53] to pre-compute suitable curves to embed
in low-end applications such as the smart card applets. Overall, from start to finish, the
44
CHAPTER 4. PAIRING FRIENDLY CURVES SEARCH
project duration was 9 months.
4.2 Calculating Pairing Friendly curves
Freeman Scott and Teske [38] published a taxonomy that encompasses all of the construc-
tions of pairing-friendly elliptic curves currently in existance. Their paper outlines three
general methods to find solutions that have been proposed.
• 1. The MNT/Freeman idea (MNT/F) [70], [37]
• 2. The Barreto-Lynn-Scott/Brezing and Weng idea (BLS/BW) [3], [16]
• 3. The Scott-Barreto idea (SB) [87]
In order to find a pairing friendly elliptic curve, it is imperative to find a curve such
that q|pk − 1, where q divides the number of points on the curve n. However, if we are
to find an actual curve we also require the parameters of the curve (n, p and t) to satisfy
the CM condition (Complex Multiplication See [27]). This is that 4p − t2, or equivalently
4n− (t− 2)2, should factor as DV 2, where D is relatively small, less than about 1012. Bear
in mind that n = p+ 1− t.
Now the the pairing friendly condition q|pk−1 can be transformed to the condition that
q|Φk(t−1), where Φk is the k-th cyclotomic polynomial [3]. The k-th cyclotomic polynomial
is the new factor that appears in the factorisation of Φk(x). For example:
Φ1(x) = (x− 1)
Φ2(x) = (x+ 1)
Φ3(x) = x
2 + x+ 1
Φ4(x) = x
2 + 1
....
Φ12(x) = x
4 − x2 + 1
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One approach to finding pairing friendly curves is to try and satisfy the polynomial
equation
DV (x)2 = 4c(x)× Φk(t(x)− 1)− (t(x)− 2)2
for some cofactor c(x) (which would ideally be 1), some t(x), and a small value for D.
However it is also sufficient that q should divide some factor of Φk(t(x)− 1), and so if this
factors into two or more irreducible polynomials, these polynomial factors can also be used
as candidates.
One approach [70], [37] is to try and force the RHS of the CM equation to be a quadratic
in x. Should this be the case, solutions can readily be found, as the CM equation can be
forced into the form of the well-known Pell equation.
A second approach is to use a brute force search through c(x) and t(x) to find a satis-
factory solution. For example if we choose c(x) = ((x− 1)2)/3, and t(x) = x+ 1, then the
RHS of the CM equation simplifies to 3((x− 1)(2x− 1)/3)2, and so we have a satisfactory
solution with D = 3 [3].
Our search programs typically attempted to search through the space of c(x), t(x), k and
D to find pairing-friendly curves.
4.3 Implementation
4.3.1 Hardware
DCU
We initially constructed a small test cluster based on a 24 450Mhz Intel Celerons to fine tune
the application and discover potential resource requirements. This cluster was configured
to run OSCAR [74], a Beowulf-type, high-performance computing cluster compatible with
more commercial super-computing resources. One of OSCAR’s strengths is that it is possible
to install multiple message passing interface (MPI) implementations on one cluster and
easily switch between them. While this facilitated our development ramp-up speed, our
46
CHAPTER 4. PAIRING FRIENDLY CURVES SEARCH
Figure 4.1: DCU cluster
hardware set-up was too undersized to address the specific problem.
ICHEC
Figure 4.2: ICHEC
We then moved our code to ICHEC whose mission is to provide high-performance com-
puting (HPC) resources for researchers in Irish third-level institutions. We successfully
applied for class C level resources which allowed us to use 25,000 Core Hours on Opteron
2.4GHz CPUs.
4.3.2 Software
We designed a reusable framework using MPI, NTL and GnuMP which could plug-in any
polynomial factoring program. The configuration established an embedding degree, avail-
able number of terms for the polynomial and a range for the co-efficient of each term.
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Table 4.1: K=34 16 CPUs 5 terms
cpu time mem (kb) vmem (kb) wall time
62 : 05 : 26 1, 539, 924 1, 918, 304 04 : 11 : 39
The solution set is found by means of a set of custom written polynomial factoring
programs which have been developed in standard C++ on Linux with output in text format
to standard file type. Subsequently, through the course of a class C project on ICHEC we
managed to further optimise the processing to be more aware of the resources available
(master/slave model for MPI). The application is designed to grow with the substantial
CPU resources required but has modest memory and data storage overheads. The class C
module environment platform comprised mpich/gcc. However, we do believe the application
to be portable to any Unix, MPI or compiler environment.
There is a dependence on the math libraries NTL and GnuMP
• NTL : A Library for doing Number Theory
• Gnu MP : GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library.
Our code is C++ and Assembly. It is not dependent on a specific number of CPUs
but adapts to the number provided by the scheduler. There is little dependency between
nodes during execution except for internal job creation and some I/O blocking when a
rare result hit occurs. This limited communication between nodes restricts the network
and memory loads. It is difficult to fully determine the performance characteristics of our
system as execution requirements depend on false positives passing tests, which require
some computation, but later are rejected by failing subsequent tests.
With our experiments, we typically segmented our jobs to run on 16 nodes. Each unit
of work 1 used CPU time outlined in Table 4.3.2.
With the class C proposal our width (range of coefficients) was usually ±12 and we
worked with 5 terms in a polynomial. We would normally use between 16 and 32 of these
runs to satisfy a search space which is about 1984 CPU hours per experiment. We had
1based on the MNTF method
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Table 4.2: K=10 32 CPUs 8 terms
cpu time mem (kb) vmem (kb) wall time
432 : 16 : 35 62, 496, 600 94, 722, 904 23 : 34 : 35
3 different experiment tests to run all with similar computation overhead. This gave us
roughly 6000 hours total CPU time. We also needed some development time and therefore
ran some of the experiments on our own limited cluster.
4.4 Results and Future Work
Our class C project did validate known curves, but also found a number of new (or new
variations) of known curves. However, from these results we’ve established that the wider
space used (from our estimation of what would fit inside a class C project’s CPU time)
didn’t produce any significantly different results.
Future work
For the future, we would see a ICHEC class B project where we aim to flatten the search
space by reducing the range of coefficients but extend the depth by increasing the number
of terms. That is set the range at ±3 but with 8 terms rather than the existing 4. This will
greatly increase the computations per experiment. Table 4.4 lists an equivalent execution
to Table 4.3.2 with the 4 extra terms added.
This increases to about 7 times the computation required per unit of work. Rolling this
through the various experiments, we would see a total of about 42, 000 hours for perfect
running experiments. We could also attempt a small number of larger runs with the width
set at ±12 and with up to 12 terms on likely polynomials (where most of the results have
been so far).
Future work would include conducting more refinement on our program code to introduce
checkpoints and restart capabilities to allow for better use of resources if, for whatever reason
a job fails to complete, it would be possible to restart from last know good position.
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Runtime
Each attempt at mapping a search space takes about 24 wall hours. As previously stated,
we require about 16 runs for each of the 3 experiments to gather enough data to produce a
judgement and potentially enough for publication. We would then attempt to completely
document the full space by completing missing runs.
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5
The Cell Broadband Engine
Background
While working with the super-computing resources in our search for pairing friendly curves
(Chapter 4), we became aware of ambitious plans from IBM/Toshiba/Sony to launch a
new processor which would challenge the performance levels achieved by current super-
computers. The published specifications indicated that these processors were very inter-
esting from a cryptographic point of view and that this radical design could break all
existing speed records. While our research focus switched from slow constrained devices to
a processor design with seemingly unlimited scalability, the techniques for optimal efficient
utilisation were very similar.
5.1 Introduction
Recently, the major performance chip manufacturers have turned to multi-core technology
as the more cost-effective alternative to ever increasing clock speeds. Well known examples
of multi-core architectures include the Intel Core Quad and AMD Phenom X4 X2 range
of chips. IBM have introduced the Cell Broadband Engine (more commonly referred to as
Cell) as their next generation CPU to feed the insatiable appetite modern multimedia and
number crunching applications have for processing power.
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The Cell is the “Wicked Smart”1 technology at the heart of Sony’s Playstation 3TM.
The Cell contains a number of specialist synergistic processor units (SPUs) optimised for
multimedia processing and offers a rich, vector processing based API to developers. The
specialised hardware design for gaming will always deliver performance gains compared to
a more generic processor for its specific domain. Multi-precision number manipulation for
use in cryptography is a considerable distance away from this domain.
We started this project in 2005 before any Cell hardware existed. IBM released a full,
cycle accurate simulator that could run linux inside a virtual machine hosted on a linux
platform enveloped inside a Tk/Tcl environment that allowed for close monitoring of the
instructions as they ran. The SDK is extremely powerful and a great example of a modern
linux development environment. It allows one to configure processor descriptions such as
instruction latency times for what-if scenarios for theoretical CPUs.
In November 2006 Sony made the Cell available inside the Playstation 3. It was released
initially in Japan and North America, with a European release in March 2007. While not
fully supported by the IBM SDK, we were anxious to see our code run on actual physical
hardware. We imported a Japanese model, quickly reformatting it to run Linux, and we
installed the SDK to see if our simulated ‘theoretical‘ matched the actual results. We were
not disappointed (and possibly had the first playstation 3 in Ireland!). Later, IBM provided
a number of academic institutions with Cell blade resources accessible on the web.
5.2 The Cell Broadband Engine
The Cell has a unique architecture combining a traditional central processor and specialised
high performance processors similar to those found in graphics cards (GPUs). These pro-
cessing units are combined across a circular high bandwidth bus (204 GB/s) [48] offering a
multi-core environment with two-instruction sets and enormous processing power. Central
to the Cell is a 3.2 GHz 64-bit Power Processing Unit (PPU). The PPU is a variant (970)
of the G5/PowerPC product line, a RISC driven processor found in IBM’s servers and Ap-
ple’s last generation PowerMac range. This PPU works as the primary processor and as
1“Wicked Smart” is an advertising slogan used by Sony
52
CHAPTER 5. THE CELL BROADBAND ENGINE
Figure 5.1: Cell Simulator
supervisor for the other cores.
The Cell can be found in the Sony Playstation 3 and the IBM QS20 and QS21 blade
server series. Note that the CBE in the Playstation 3 makes just 6 out of 8 SPUs available
for general purpose computations. Toshiba equips several laptops of the Qosmio series with
the SpursEngine consisting of 4 SPUs intended for media processing. This SpursEngine can
also be found in a PCI Express card called WinFast pxVC1100 manufactured by Leadtek
which is currently available only in Japan.
5.2.1 The Cell’s SPU
The real power of the Cell is in the ability to harness the additional Synergistic Processing
Units (SPUs). The SPU is a specialist processor with a RISC-like SIMD 2 instruction set
and a large (128) array of 128-bit registers. Each SPU has its own local memory store (LS).
Currently, this LS is limited to just 256K. The SPU can access the LS in the same clock
cycle as its register operations. While the architecture allows for any number of SPUs, a
standard Cell, and those currently in production, has 8 SPUs.
A processor with just 256K, no hardware cache and with no access to I/O doesn’t appear
2Single Instruction Multiple Data
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]
Figure 5.2: Cell BE Die Layout (source IBM marketing material)
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]
Figure 5.3: Cell BE logical diagram
to be anything exciting when compared to the PPU or other modern CPUs. It is the fact
that the Cell offers 8 SPUs on one die all designed to operate in parallel combined with the
ability to work with up to 4× 32-bit integer operations in just one clock cycle (referred to
as SIMD) that make the SPU so interesting. The SPU also contains 2 instruction pipelines
and while the pipelines are not equal, careful management of the order of instructions can
lead to huge amounts of data being processed with very few clock cycles and a very low
clock cycles per instruction (CPI) ratio.
The large register size is ideal for the number crunching operations required for cryp-
tography. However, the fact that the size of the register is too large for most high level
language’s basic types, and that most operations work with, at most, 32-bit sub-sections of
the quadword register, makes development complex. The programmer accesses the registers
through a set of C extensions which operate exclusively on vectors rather than traditional
direct memory access. The C extensions (or intrinsics) also offer a degree of code portability
with similar CPUs such as the Altivec. It is possible to develop small, dedicated, standalone
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SPU applications (spulets). A more interesting, but more complex, model is the capability
of the PPU to call SPU applications through a POSIX threads-like library passing data
through a direct memory access (DMA) library.
The SPU has two pipelines (pipeline 0 and pipeline 1); each cycle it can dispatch one
instruction per pipeline. Whether or not the SPU really dispatches two instructions in a
given cycle is highly dependent on instruction scheduling and alignment. This is subject to
the following conditions:
• Execution of instructions is purely in-order.
• The two pipelines execute disjoint sets of instructions (i.e. each instruction is either
a pipeline-0 or a pipeline-1 instruction).
• The SPU has a fetch queue that can contain at most two instructions.
• Instructions are fetched into the fetch queue only if the fetch queue is empty.
• Instructions are fetched in pairs; the first instruction in such a pair is from an even
word address, the second from an odd word address.
• The SPU executes two instructions in one cycle only if two instructions are in the
fetch queue, the first being a pipeline-0 instruction and the second being a pipeline-1
instruction and all inputs to these instructions being available and not pending due
to latencies of previously executed instructions.
Hence, instruction scheduling has to ensure that pipeline-0 and pipeline-1 instructions are in-
terleaved and that latencies are hidden; instruction alignment has to ensure that pipeline-0
instructions are at even word addresses and pipeline-1 instructions are at odd word ad-
dresses.
The implementations outlined later in this thesis (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) and the IBM
SDK’s MPM library build the finite field arithmetic on the integer arithmetic instructions
of the SPU. This is due to the fact that single-precision floating-point arithmetic offers
too small a mantissa and that double-precision, floating-point arithmetic causes excessive
pipeline stalls on the SPU and is therefore very inefficient.
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All integer arithmetic instructions (except shift and rotate instructions) are SIMD in-
structions operating either on 4 32-bit word elements or on 8 16-bit halfword elements or
on 16 8-bit byte elements of a 128-bit register.
This simple example is a 4-wide add. Each of the 4 elements in register vector VA is
added to the corresponding element in register VB the 4 results are placed in the appropriate
slots in reg VC. Obviously, this becomes more complex when one considers overflow after
an add.
Figure 5.4: A SIMD Instruction example (source IBM training material)
Integer multiplication is an exception to this rule: The integer multiplication instructions
multiply 4 16-bit halfwords in parallel and store the 32-bit results in the 4-word elements
of the result register.
The following instructions are the most relevant for our implementations; for a detailed
description of the SPU instruction set see [50], for a list of instruction latencies and associ-
ated pipelines see [49, Appendix B].
a: Adds each 32-bit word element of a register a to the corresponding word element of a
register b and stores the results in a register r.
mpy: Multiplies the 16 least significant bits of each 32-bit word element of a register a with
the corresponding 16 bits of each word element of a register b and stores the resulting
four 32-bit results in the four word elements of a register r.
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mpya: Multiplies 16-bit halfwords as the mpy instruction but adds the resulting four 32-
bit word elements to the corresponding word elements of a register c and stores the
resulting sum in a register r.
shl: Shifts each word element of a register a to the left by the number of bits given by
the corresponding word element of a register b and stores the result in a register r.
rotmi: Shifts of each word element of a register a to the right by the number of bits given
in an immediate value and stores the result in a register r.
shufb: Allows to set each byte of the result register r to either the value of an arbitrary
byte of one of two input registers a and b or to a constant value of 0, 0x80 or 0xff.
5.2.2 Multi-instruction sets
One interesting issue with the different architectures of the PPU and SPU is the need for
multi-instruction set binaries. Traditional applications compile individual source modules
and then link the results to bind all program data symbols (variable, types, functions etc.).
But as the SPUs LS memory is physically separate and makes use of wide 128-bit registers,
its program code needs to be compiled and linked separately. Both the SPU and PPU use
standard ELF binary formats. An application’s binary contains 64-bit code for the main
PPU but embedded inside this is an object file with the SPU instructions and data ready
to be pushed to the SPU on a spe_create_thread() call from the PPC. The build process
involves two separate compilers and two linkers. The SPU ELF binary is passed through
an embedspu command which builds a wrapper (a CESOF linkable) to the SPU binary
marking it with PPU compatible symbols. Finally, there is one more link stage which binds
all executables together. Figure 5.5 [21] outlines the build process.
5.2.3 The Cell as a Hardware Security Module
The Cell has been designed with an interesting security architecture [90]. The feature set
suggests it is primarily to aid in the management of digital rights, however, the interface is
also open to third party developers to implement additional security functionality into code
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Figure 5.5: Cell BE build process[21]
running on an SPU. This architecture can be used to make security critical code run in a
protected environment as a Hardware Security Module (HSM). Commercially, most of the
SSL accelerator vendors offer HSM’s in high-end configurations.
To operate in a more protected environment, the critical SSL code can be run in an
SPU in isolated mode. For an SSL accelerator, this means that it is possible to have any
key generation method make use of a cryptographically secure random number generator,
that key data can be protected from other processes running on the Cell, key data can be
encrypted in shared memory locations and program code can check its integrity.
The Cell achieves this level of security by implementing a hardware based process in
which
1. The code and data in an SPU can be executed in physically isolated memory space.
2. There is hardware based code signing (referred to as secure boot) where the integrity
of code about to be executed can be verified.
3. An isolated process in an SPU can use hardware-key based data encryption/decryption
that can only be used by code that has been verified.
4. The random number generator can be configured to use a physical sample source such
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as the Cell Hardware RNG found on some models of the Cell. (note: this functionality
is limited on our PS3 based Cell).
This extra security comes with a performance penalty. Initialisation would be affected by
secure boot, if data were to be stored off SPU. Then there can be runtime overheads in
decryption. The various random number generators degrade in performance as one moves
towards a more random, physical sample-based library. Unfortunately implementation de-
tails are only available under Non-Disclosure Agreement with IBM and so we are not able to
test our SPU acceleration code in this interesting environment. While this should concern
people using our accelerator in production environments, the raw performance figures we
use throughout this paper reflect the speed of the underlying mathematical operations and
would be the same post initialisation.
For further information on the Cell’s HSM see IBM’s Cell resource centre [28]
5.3 Development
For applications like those constructed in Chapter 6 we need to build PPU libraries (32 or
64-bit) that plug into a PPU build of higher layer libraries through defined interfaces. Inside
these libraries we embed an SPU ELF executable which can act upon the 128-bit registers
and utilises IBM’s MPM library. In other cases, where we were more concerned with raw
performance numbers, we can use small spulets. These are SPU ELF binaries, in a minimal
PPU wrapper. These can be looked upon as standalone SPU executables, however, we have
to use separate performance analysis tools when profiling them and unfortunately these
are slightly inaccurate. All these SPU ELF executables need to be under 256K including
all code and data. The multi-core environment with the limitations on code and data size
requires some unconventional, data centric, programming models which the engineering
community are still evolving. The cardinal rule appears to be to oﬄoad as much as possible
to the SPUs. Many data intensive multimedia applications employ a model where data is
streamed through a chain of SPUs with each SPU carrying out a specific operation on the
data, then calling another SPU with the processed data. Yet another model makes the
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PPU act as a scheduler pushing data segments and code blobs to any SPU with the PPU
managing the operations and data ordering through double buffering.
5.3.1 Direct Memory Access
As per above, the PPU can access main memory and has instructions to transfer data
between the main memory and its registers. The SPU, on the other hand, works with its
own smaller local store and so to access data from the main memory the SPU goes through a
Memory Flow Controller (MFC) which translates SPU main memory requests over the high
speed bus via a set of DMA channel calls. These DMA calls are directional (read or write),
blocking or non-blocking, can be issued in parallel and can be tagged by the programmer
to allow for identification management of data.
When communicating either the PPU or an SPU can initiate and manage a DMA
transfer. However it is optimal for the SPU to do the protocol management as it can free
PPU clock cycles that can occur if, for example, a number of SPUs have blocking calls.
When the PPU needs to initiate the transfer the procedure is for the PPU to push a pointer
to the SPU with a tag and then let the SPU pull the data from the pointed reference
informing the PPU, via the tag, that it has done so.
5.3.2 Vector Programming
To utilise the full performance of SPU SIMD instructions, a developer works with a combi-
nation of Vector C extensions with assembly-like code. We look at the following extracts to
highlight typical techniques used. We implemented a primitive MADD() commonly used in
cryptographic libraries which fully utilises the 128-bit register by implementing a 64x64-bit
multiply function.
The following intrinsics code fragment is used to fill a quadword with two scalars (in
this case standard C 64-bit unsigned long long) and to splat across a vector. Splat is a
term used when filling a vector with a mask. In a big number context we utilise splats to
allow us operate on different elements of a quadword when filling partial products.
unsigned long long a , b
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vec to r unsigned shor t AB;
AB=( vec to r unsigned shor t ) \
s p u i n s e r t ( a , ( vec to r unsigned long long )AB, 0 x1 ) ;
AB=( vec to r unsigned shor t ) \
s p u i n s e r t ( b , ( vec to r unsigned long long )AB, 0 x0 ) ;
/∗ s e l e c t two b y t e s ∗/
const vec to r unsigned char s p l a t s h o r t 1= \
( vec to r unsigned char ) (VEC SPLAT U32(0 x80800405 ) ) ;
Here we utilise a C macro to guarantee all vector multiplies (spu_mulo()) are at a 16-bit
level to efficiently use the 16x16-bit multiplier in the SPU.
#d e f i n e MULTIPLY( a , b)\
( spu ex t rac t ( spu mulo ( ( vec to r unsigned shor t ) spu promote ( a , 0 )\
, ( vec to r unsigned shor t ) spu promote (b , 0 ) ) , 0 ) )
Finally, we implement an elegant speed up technique which can be used when adding a
128-bit value to a 64-bit value where overflow is not a concern. This technique is used in
summing partial products inside the big number multiply.
vec to r unsigned i n t out s , in a128 , in a64 ;
vec to r unsigned i n t sum , c0 , t0 ;
c0 = spu genc ( in a128 , in a64 ) ; // genera te carry b i t s
sum = spu add ( in a128 , in a64 ) ; // add
t0 = spu s lqwbyte ( c0 , 4 ) ; // s h i f t quadword l e f t 4 b y t e s
out s = spu add ( sum , t0 ) ; // add in the carry
Longer, more detailed code segments are attached in Appendix B. This code is the
output of an automated code generator which was written as part of my Ph.D. work. It
was used extensively in the remainder of this thesis and in particular to produce the code
highlighted in Chapter 7.
Code generation was considered as manually unrolling code by cut n paste leads to hard
to find errors. It also offers the most flexibility when considering fixed sizes.
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5.3.3 Usage Models
The multi-core architecture, with small SPU core, allows developers to use concurrency and
produces the interesting code/data models outlined in 5.6. Simply put run in sequence, run
in parallel, or have dedicated parallel processes.
Figure 5.6: Usage models
An enlightening analogy from a coding SPU presentation from Insomniac (the game
developers): Old model :- Large semi truck. Stuff everything in. Then stuff some more.
Then put some stuff up front. Then drive away. New model :- Fleet of Ford GTs taking
off every five minutes. Each one only fits so much. They also say The ultimate goal: Get
everything on the SPUs. Leave the PPU for shuﬄing stuff around. This appears to the
design paradigm for all Cell developers.
In Chapter 6 we are more concerned with throughput and follow a model of same code
for multi SPUs with the PPU as controller. Whereas in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, we focus
on models where the SPU is viewed a standalone special purpose CPU.
5.3.4 Compilation
There are two C compilers for the Cell, derived ppu-gcc/spu-gcc combination or IBM’s
commercial XLC. Our experience is that both generate good code, neither is consistently
better than the other and that for critical sections of code, both benefit from manual
optimisation steps. All numbers are quoted with the highest -O3 optimisation flag set.
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Accelerating SSL with the Cell Broadband Engine
Background
The Cell development environment came pre-loaded with a commonly used open source
network and cryptographic toolkit (see Chapter 6 Section 6.1.1) which is commonly used
for processor benchmarking. It allowed us to compare performance levels of this much antic-
ipated processor with traditional desktop and servers. Initial results were not so impressive
as the toolkit had not been optimised to take advantage of this exciting new design.
6.1 Why SSL?
Despite huge gains in computing performance and bandwidth, the widespread use of secure
communications over the Internet is still essentially limited to SSL connections for password
logins or for credit card payments. Despite this, SSL implementations are widely distributed
and well analysed, making it the de-facto standard for secure communications. The main
reason encryption is limited to logins and payments, and is not ’always on‘, is the perception
that encrypted communication protocols such as SSL place too high demands on bandwidth
and processing power at the server side of the communication and can interrupt the browsing
experience of the client. This chapter sets out to show that with the performance of modern
multi-core hardware devices it is now possible to enable secure channels for a wider range
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of network communications.
6.1.1 OpenSSL
OpenSSL [1] is an open source toolkit released under under a BSD style license and is the
de facto open source SSL toolkit. It is included in virtually all UNIX distributions including
Linux, MacOSXTM, and SolarisTM.
The name OpenSSL is misleading as the toolkit provides a vast array of building blocks
and interfaces from big number routines, cryptographic primitives through to PKI compo-
nents such as certificate authorities and OCSP responders. One of the most useful features
is the ability to factor out processing intensive operations to specialist hardware through
an engine interface. It is through this engine subsystem that we accelerate SSL by using
the Cell SPU’s vector processing capabilities.
SSL operates in two phases: an initial handshake and a symmetric encryption phase.
The purpose of the handshake is to swap identification credentials, algorithm capabilities,
and negotiate a bulk encryption key. The reason for the key negotiation is that asymmetric
cryptography, whilst needed to establish a shared secret, incurs a large computational over-
head compared to a symmetric encryption algorithm. By analysing clock cycles, Zhao et al.
[12] found that 90.4% of the SSL handshake comprises public key operations. Cryptographic
operations take, in total, about 95% of the total CPU load.
Since the CPU load will be heaviest at the server side 1, and since the main computa-
tional load incurred by the server for its part in the handshake is asymmetric decryption,
we focus our attempts on speeding up asymmetric decryption.
Isolating the SSL handshake to measure our improvements is a challenging task as there
are can be many dependencies (network traffic, HTTP server etc.) on a running machine
which make accurate sampling difficult. Fortunately OpenSSL provides the utility openssl
speed which can measure individual algorithms. Using this utility we can demonstrate
improvements to the throughput of the critical algorithms. The SSL protocol supports a
range of asymmetric algorithms, (RSA, DSA, ECC etc.). In this Chapter we focus on RSA
1One server is expected to deal with many clients which makes accurate sampling difficult
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but the improvement is relevant to all.
6.2 Architecture
To fit the OpenSSL engine model, we mirror the operation of a similar engine developed by
Geoff Thorpe of the OpenSSL core team for the GNU Multi-Precision library (GMP) [94].
To have the SPUs do as much work as possible we chose to overload the RSA_mod_exp()
function and indicate through control flags that the engine should perform full RSA decryp-
tion using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Figure 6.1 describes the interaction between
the various components. This allows us to potentially parallelise the modular exponentiation
calls. We could approach this a number of ways:
OpenSSL
SPU
PPU Engine
SPU
SPU
Figure 6.1: OpenSSL with Engine and SPUs
1. Have the PPU do the RSA/CRT but invoke SPUs to manage the expensive modular
exponential (mod_exp()). Different SPUs would handle the p and q mod_exp().
2. Have the PPU pass the whole RSA/CRT to an SPU.
3. Have the PPU pass the whole RSA/CRT to an SPU with this SPU passing the two
mod_exp() to two other SPUs.
4. Have the PPU pass the whole RSA/CRT to an SPU with this SPU passing one of the
two mod_exp() to another SPU and, in parallel, handle the other.
There are a number of advantages to each. With (1) the amount of data in the DMA
bus is reduced but it breaks the guideline of oﬄoading as much computation as possible to
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an SPU. With (3 and 4) the latency per SSL connection will be reduced but, as it adds
extra DMA data to the bus, the overall maximum throughput will be affected. With (2,
3 and 4) we can double buffer the data transfer, for example passing the p parameter to
the bus while the SPU is processing the q mod_exp(). The double buffering technique
would offer relatively small speed gains. We implemented (1) and (2) and found the initial
speed up to be marginally better but the maximum throughput to be slightly lower. This
is explained by an increased amount of SPU invocations. In an attempt to measure the
maximum throughput we chose to focus on (2).
To maintain compatibility with OpenSSL and other engine implementations we use
notation matching OpenSSL code: dmp1, the decryption exponent modp − 1, dmq1, the
decryption exponentmodq − 1. iqmp is the inverse of q mod p. I0 is the ciphertext. A
decryption exponent d, for a prime p, is a number d, such that med mod p = m or ed =
1 mod (p− 1), where e is the encryption exponent, commonly chosen to be 3 or 65537.
At the RSA initialisation stage OpenSSL passes the (p, q, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp) parameters
to the engine. At this stage we check the parameters, allocate a memory store, fill the store
with local copies of the big numbers ready to pass to an SPU, and then pass the memory
store pointer back through a thread-safe and thread-local memory store. OpenSSL uses this
reference again when making calls to the main overloaded RSA_mod_exp() function with I0
and the same thread memory store parameter. The overloaded mod_exp() extracts the
thread local data, calls an SPU thread, DMA transfers the location and size of the memory
store to the SPU. It then allocates space for the return data from the SPU.
As mentioned above, the SPU thread when activated could either receive all parameters
in a full DMA transfer or, more efficiently, a pointer to the block of big numbers in mem-
ory on the Cell’s main store. By passing the pointer, the SPU’s memory flow controller
effectively takes the memory processing away from the main PPU, further improving the
performance.
At this stage the SPU thread converts the big number set to the IBM MPM format and
carries out the CRT logic. On successful completion it takes the result, pushes it back to
the PPU using the DMA tag that the I0 parameter was sent with, finally cleaning up any
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memory used by the engine and exiting.
Big number representation Unfortunately there is no standard method for big
number representation with most multi-precision systems/libraries choosing variants of
struct {
unsigned int size;
<largest basic type> *words;
}
Subtle differences exist. Be it big endian or little endian ordering of the words, or if the
number structure keeps track of its own data size. The OpenSSL representation is of the
form
struct bignum_st{
BN_ULONG *d;
int top;
int dmax;
int neg;
int flags;
};
BN ULONG represents the largest underlying type and dmax, neg, and flags hold useful
internal management data. On the PPU we can build either a 32-bit or 64-bit binary. We
chose 64 and so BN ULONG is a 64 bit type (unsigned long long). The IBM MPM on
the SPU can utilise the vector quadword register to contain 8 elements of a smaller 16-
bit unsigned short type which it can handle very efficiently in its 16x16 multiplier. For
example a 12 instruction load and store (LS) has a latency of just 6 clock cycles [30]. The
type is implicit and of the simple form
vector * unsigned int;
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Use of the IBM MPM library is, therefore, a little more complicated as one needs to
keep track of the size of each variable and one has to remember that the most significant
word is a zero padded quadword. An example can illustrate.
Take the big number
0x111122223333444455556666777788889999
OpenSSL places this in an array
[0] 66667777 88889999
[1] 22223333 44445555
[2] 00000000 00001111
The IBM MPM library represents this in a 2 quadword array as follows:
[0] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00001111
[1] 22223333 44445555 66667777 88889999
6.3 RSA/CRT
We implement traditional RSA Decryption using Chinese Remainder Theorem but with a
small modification. Because the SPU is restrictive in some respects we need to maintain a
sequence of calls that ensure the results of any modular exponentiation stay positive. We
must also be cognisant of the following:
1. The SPU compiler optimiser is most efficient when there is no branching.
2. The IBM MPM library is intended to work with unsigned numbers.
3. Integer comparison operations (less than, greater than) on negative numbers are un-
defined.
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Algorithm 6.1 RSA Decryption using Chinese Remainder Theorem modified for the IBM
MPM unsigned restrictions.
Input: p, q, I0, dmq1, dmp1, iqmp
Output: r0
1: r1 ← I0 mod q
2: m1 ← r1dmq1 mod q
3: r1 ← I0 mod p
4: r0 ← rdmp11 mod p
5: r0 ← r0 −m1
6: if r0 < 0 r0 ← r0 + p
7: r1 ← r0 · iqmp
8: r0 ← r1 mod p
9: r1 ← r0 · q
10: r0 ← r1 +m1
To overcome these restrictions we assume p is always less than q, a condition OpenSSL
guarantees. The modified algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 6.1. Note We follow OpenSSL
notation found in all engine implementations.
The IBM-MPM library offers an alternative modular exponentiation function which uses
the Montgomery reduction technique. This is more efficient than the classic product then
reduce the result modulo n approach as it keeps the numbers from growing unnecessarily.
See ([67]. Chapter 14)
6.4 Results
Table 6.1 lists timings in cycles counts and milliseconds for the main processor intensive
functions of the RSA/CRT implementation. Two totals are presented: sum of these calls
and an observed timing for all calls including some initialisation and the DMA receive calls.
These timings are made using an engine with just one SPU configured.
We can see that, as expected, the mpm_mont_mod_exp()2 calls represent the bulk of the
time consuming operations. A case could be made for a design that oﬄoaded just this call
to an SPU. Theoretically (from the results of Table 6.1) we can expect the SPU to be able
to process 14.8 4096-bit decryptions in a second. Interestingly (from Table 6.2) we achieve
close to this at 14.1. Obviously there is additional overhead from DMA and the process
2The generic mpm_mod_exp() clocks at 136914856 cycles for a 4096-bit modulus
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function calls cycle count cycles millisecs secs #/sec
big number convert() 7 877 6139 0.00192
mpm mod() 4 77731 310924 0.09716
mpm mont mod exp() 2 93328909 186657818 58.33057
mpm mul() 1 22733 22733 0.00710
mpm sub() 1 704 704 0.00022
mpm add() 1 1116 1116 0.00035
mpm madd() 1 39648 39648 0.01239
sub-total 187039082 0.05845
Total includes other calls 215159632 0.06724 14.87
Table 6.1: RSA/CRT decryption implemented in IBM MPM function calls with cycle count
and time in milliseconds for a 4096-bit key
queue on the main PPU. Cycle counts are from the SDK’s simulator. Unfortunately the
simulator (at this time) cannot measure DMA or PPU latency.
As mentioned previously, to get some sense of the improvements our optimisations have
made we use the openssl speed command on RSA with the engine off (native OpenSSL
on the PPU) and with our engine on utilising the SPU.
Tests are run on a 3.2 GHz Playstation 3 with just 6 SPUs running Fedora with kernel
version 2.6.273. A server/blade Cell system would have up to 16 SPUs. We could expect
the Playstation Cell to deliver a throughput of up to 89 sign/sec and a blade server to go as
high as 237 sign/sec. In reality we observe slightly lower results (Table 6.3). As mentioned
there are number of factors that could skew our observed numbers, mainly the design of
the OpenSSL speed post-processing, DMA overhead and the fact that the PPU is busy
managing the multiprocess queue. OpenSSL is configured for 64-bit PPC/G5 ASM 4.
From Table 6.3 we can see that the overhead of the DMA transfer and the big number
conversion impact the performance improvements just below the 2048-bit key. The benefits
of the 128-bit registers are apparent at 4096-bit level with improvements in the order of
150% (14.1 sign/sec vs. 9.1).
To see the full impact of the multi-core we need to use the -multi [n] option to the speed
3Linux ps3 2.6.27.9-159.fc10.ppc64
4Options: bn(64,64) md2(int) rc4(ptr,char) des(idx,risc1,16,long) aes(partial) idea(int) blowfish(idx) com-
piler: ppu-gcc -DOPENSSL USE MPM SPU -DOPENSSL THREADS -D REENTRANT -DDSO DLFCN
-DHAVE DLFCN H -m64 -DB ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
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RSA PPU 1 SPU
key length sign sign/sec sign sign/sec
1024-bits 0.003435s 291.2 0.005655s 176.8
2048-bits 0.017541s 57.0 0.015636s 64.0
4096-bits 0.109793s 9.1 0.070915s 14.1
Table 6.2: OpenSSL speed on PPU vs. 1 SPU using IBM-MPM on 3.2GHz Cell
command which can (through fork()) generate multiple simultaneous RSA operations. We
have picked a number (6) of parallel processes to run matching the number of SPUs on the
Playstation 3. It is important to note that the -multi option introduces some small pro-
cessing overhead to the speed command as it uses a fork() invocation whereas the standard
calls are single threaded. Again we compare the PPU with an SPU enabled engine.
We see from Table 6.3 similar overheads impacting the 1024-bit keys. However there is
a huge improvement in 2048-bit (329.7 vs 71.7) and 4096-bit (83.6 vs 9.1).
RSA PPU 6 SPUs
key length sign sign/sec sign sign/sec
1024-bits 0.003435s 291.2 0.001906s 524.7
2048-bits 0.017541s 57.0 0.003033s 329.7
4096-bits 0.109793s 9.1 0.011925s 83.9
Table 6.3: OpenSSL speed on PPU vs. 6 SPUs using IBM-MPM on 3.2GHz Cell, 6 parallel
processes.
While the openssl speed utility running on the 6 SPU Cell inside a Playstation 3 gives
us a solid basis to develop and measure our improvements, Se´an Starke at IBM was kind
enough to try our tests in a full 16 SPU dual Cell blade. These results (Table 6.4) are
consistent with the trend from the Playstation 3 results.
RSA 2 PPUs 16 SPUs
key length sign sign/sec sign sign/sec
1024-bits 0.001270s 787.5 0.001509s 662.7
2048-bits 0.006805s 146.9 0.001664s 601.0
4096-bits 0.043944s 22.8 0.005762s 173.6
Table 6.4: OpenSSL speed on 2 PPUs vs. 16 SPUs using IBM-MPM on 3.2GHz Cell, 16
parallel processes.
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6.5 Conclusions and Future Work
We believe that we have pushed the Cell SDK’s IBM-MPM library to its limits. The library
is an excellent demonstration of the power of SPU intrinsics ‘vector’ programming. However,
we believe the introduction of an optimised number library more suited to cryptography
can substantially improve the performance, possibly doubling the figures presented above.
As mentioned the results are based on using generic Montgomery
mpm_mont_mod_exp() function. This function allows for any size parameters, however most
commonly used parameters are based on fixed key lengths (1024, 2048 etc.) These fixed
lengths can offer further optimisations as they always align on the 128-bit boundaries of the
vectors so that the number of partial products to be summed inside any multiplies can be
determined allowing for very efficient carry management.
The multiplication inside the mpm_mont_mod_exp() needs to be examined in more detail.
MPM uses ‘row by row’ operand scanning to do big number multiplies whereas a ‘column by
column’ product scanning technique used by the Comba [24] method would be more suitable
for the large, fixed sized numbers used by cryptography. Furthermore, as the number length
moves beyond 1024-bit the Comba method can be combined with the Karatsuba technique
[57] for further improvement.
OpenSSL uses this Comba/Karatsuba combination at key lengths above 1024-bit irre-
spective of the architecture. We hope to swap out the IBM MPM library and use a fine
tuned version of MIRACL ([84] and Chapter 7, Section 7.1.2) with fixed key sizes on fixed
128-bit alignment, utilising the Comba/Karatsuba speed ups on longer key lengths.
The threshold key length to optimally use the Karatsuba method depends heavily on
the underlying word size and the architecture’s instruction set, specifically how fast the
multiplier is compared to the addition. We hope to examine this threshold in more detail
with the more flexible MIRACL library.
The PPU to SPU data transfers are based on the commonly used DMA transfer usually
associated with streaming and double buffering, it would be an interesting exercise to pre-
load the SPU with the RSA code at initialisation and then use Mailboxes to manage the
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data transfers. This technique may reduce the data on the high bandwidth bus.
While the openssl speed utility running on the 6 SPU Cell inside a Playstation 3 gives
us a solid basis to develop and measure our improvements, we would like to test the results
on full 16 SPU dual Cell with a commercial grade SSL/HTTP load testing suite.
Commercial, built for purpose, SSL accelerators tend to offer secure key management
capabilities. It would be interesting to examine the full design, and performance impact of
the full HSM outlined in (Section 5.2.3).
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7
Utilising the Cell’s SPU for ECC
Background
The publication of the results achieved at the security protocol level (see Chapter 6) on the
Cell led us to collaborate with a team looking at Pseudo-random number generators on the
Cell for use by super computing packages (such as weather forecast simulators). Our work
focused on developing efficient integer arithmetic routines used by a linear congruential
generator (LCG). The subsequent publication by IBM of an extensive SDK which allowed
third party developers to access the physical random sources on the Cell led to this work
being redundant. We then reused the fast 64-bit integer arithmetic routines by merging
them into a wider toolkit usable inside a cryptographic library with interesting results.
7.1 Introduction
We focus on a range of optimising techniques for the Cell SPU (SPU intrinsics, pipe-line
analysis, branch reduction). We show the significant performance improvements that can
be achieved when first optimising the lowest level multiply, then applying these steps to the
IBM multi-precision (MPM) library at a fixed, relatively small number size as used by ECC
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7.1.1 Modular Components
Alvaro, Kurzak and Dongarra, [59] introduce the idea of a computation micro-kernel for the
SPU where the restricted code & data size of the SPU become important design criteria but
issues such as inter-chip communication and synchronisation are not considered. The kernel
focuses on utilisation of the wide registry and the instruction level parallelism. Furthermore,
for security-aware applications such as those using ECC, there is an interesting security
architecture where an SPU can run in isolation mode, where inter-chip communications,
loading and unloading program code incur significant overhead. We aim to design a small,
fit-for-purpose, micro-kernel suitable for use inside a larger security application, such as a
Hardware Security Module (HSM), perhaps as a key negotiation module for an AES stream
encryptor kernel inside a Cell SPU.
7.1.2 Multi-precision Tookits
High-level programming languages have limits on the size of the native basic data types.
C++, for example, usually has a limit of 64-bits for its largest integer (an unsigned long long).
The SPUs 128-bit register is too large for this type, however, it can hold the result of the
multiplication of the product of a pair of unsigned long longs. To fully utilise the register
size and perform the larger multi-precison math, we use 3rd party libraries. These libraries
fragment the operations on big numbers into smaller “chunks” which fit the processor’s word
length. This deconstruction comes with a performance penalty. The larger the chunk, the
more efficient the library. For example, the SPU hardware multiplier is just 16-bit by 16-bit.
The most efficient method for a.b (64 × 64-bit) multiply is to break them down into 16-
bit sub-words to use a standard school book (classical or “grammar-school” [27] Chapter 9
Section 9.1) multiply via the spu mulo() intrinsic to carry out 4 partial products in parallel.
MIRACL
MIRACL 1 [84] is a portable, light weight, multi-precision library widely used for building
cryptographic toolkits. Its key strength is its ability to get near optimal performance from
1Mike Scott, my supervisor, is the principle behind the MIRACL library.
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any processor and to do so in small, compact code size. It achieves this by allowing a
developer to provide substitute routines in assembly for each particular architecture. We
use this technique to provide routines utilising SPU intrinsics for 64-bit multiply. We then
use this code to produce optimised, unrolled code for 256-bit (SPU or PPU). MIRACL is
the easiest multi-precision library to use for this task as it is implemented in standard C, is
very extensive, well-documented and allows the developer to choose the level of abstraction
from the processor. The level of abstraction (C++, C, assembler) tends to impact on
performance.
Listing 7.1: MIRACL source example
big mir r0 , mir r1 , mir p , mir r1 , mir dmq1 , mir q , mir m1 ;
powmod(mip , mir r1 , mir dmq1 , mir q , mir m1 ) ;
mir mod ( mir r0 , mir r1 , mir p ) ;
IBM MPM
As previously mentioned (Chapter 5 Section 5.1), IBM offer a software development kit [29]
containing development tools and code samples including a vector optimised Multi-Precision
Math library (IBM MPM) [51]. The library is limited compared to MIRACL, has had some
“question marks” over the integrity of the reduction algorithm (see Section 7.5), but is very
efficient on the SPU.
Listing 7.2: MPM source example
vec to r unsigned i n t v r1 [N ] ;
const i n t mod exp window sz =6;
mpm mod( v r1 , v I0 , s z I0 , v q , s z q ) ;
s z r 1=sz q ;
mpm mont mod exp(v m1 , v r1 , v dmq1 , sz dmq1 , v q , sz q , mod exp window sz ) ;
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QHASM
Dan J. Bernstein developed qhasm [8] as a “portable” assembly language to help develop
cryptographic functions as close to native CPU assembler as possible. Together with Peter
Schwabe, we ported qhasm to the Cell’s SPU. The results are described in more detail in
(Chapter 8). To quote Bernstein “We need languages that are not portable in the second
sense. Some speed-critical chunks of code are written separately for different CPUs; we
need programming tools that don’t tie the programmer’s hands. It’s no problem if the
resulting code can’t run on more than one CPU.” The result is a powerful ability to describe
cryptographic primitives, required data types and work close to instruction scheduling. The
task is essentially mapping assembly instructions to qhasm code and using a qhasm language
to develop algorithms.
Listing 7.3: qhasm source example
vec128 a3
vec128 shlw0001
a3 = ∗( vec128 ∗) ( ( binp + 0) & ˜15)
int32323232 a3s1 = a3 << shlw0001
7.1.3 ECC Hierarchy
In ([45] Chapter 5 Section 5.2.1) Hankerson, Menezes & Vanstone outline a hierarchy of
operations in ECC as protocols, point multiplication, elliptic curve addition and doubling
and finite field arithmetic. Fan, Sakiyama & Verbauwhede [36] expand this to describe a
5-layer pyramid of
1. Integrity, confidentially, Authentication
2. EC Scalar Multiplication kP
3. Point addition and doubling
4. Modular operations on Fp
5. Instructions of a w-bit core
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We implement the stack outlined in the ECC hierarchy using Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change as an application at the protocol layer and MIRACL for point multiplication, addi-
tion & doubling. We then provide SPU optimised routines for modular lower layer opera-
tions. We approach this in a various ways and compare the results.
The main issue with symmetric key encryption algorithms, such as AES is the key
distribution problem. In 1976 a solution was proposed by Diffie-Hellman [31] in the same
ground breaking paper they introduced public key cryptography, where the computationally
expensive asymmetric encryption is used to swap keys to be subsequently used by the more
efficient symmetric algorithms.
7.1.4 Suitable Curve
To ease adoption, and allay fears of weakness for certain curves, the US standards body,
NIST, has recommended 15 curves of varying security levels for use by US federal agencies.
Most commercial implementations make use of these curves.
The NIST-256 prime 2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1 is unsuitable as 224 is not divisible by
64, so we choose to generate our own elliptic curve over Fp.
As we hope to use the IBM MPM library as a building block for the large number math,
we chose to use a curve defined over Fp where p is 256-bits, a multiple of the SPUs register
size. It is more common for embedded or resource constrained devices to use a 192-bit prime
curve.
For efficient implementation, we choose a modulus that supports fast reduction and A
was fixed at -3. This is a pseudo-mersenne prime of the form 2n − c where c is small.
Unfortunately, pseudo-mersenne prime’s were patented by Crandall while he worked for
Next. Thereafter, they passed to Apple, who have never enforced them. When it came to
standardisation the standards body chose not to use a patented method and use Generalised
Mersenne prime of the form 2n±−2m+..1, where n, m, etc are all divisible by the word length
of the computer. This is not as satisfactory for efficient reduction, but it is unpatented.
We also need the number of points on the curve (the group order) q, to be prime. We
are looking for p to be 256-bits. We first locate c so that 2256 − c where c is small. We find
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that 2256− 189 2 is prime. To locate a suitable curve with this c we use tools included with
MIRACL library [84] which implement some improvements on the Schoof [83] algorithm for
counting points on a Fp) elliptic curve. The Schoof-Elkies-Atkin algorithm finds a number of
suitable curves in approximately one hour on a standard PC. However, we add the additional
constraint the q > p so as to fit inside our 256-bit optimised routines. This extends the
search to approximately one day. These curve-finding utilities require being run just once
and can be reused.
The first suitable curve, in short form Weierstraß, that fits our extended criteria is:
y2 = x3 − 3x+ 1403 mod 2256 − 189 (7.1)
7.2 Multiply bottleneck
At the lowest level, the instructions of a w-bit core, the bottleneck for performance is the
frequency with which it must perform multiply/add (also known as MADD()) operations.
That is d = ((a× b+ c) mod (2128)).
As mentioned before, the large register size is ideal for the number-crunching operations
required for MADD(). However, most operations work with, at most, 32-bit sub-sections of
the quadword register, the integer multiply operations being especially limiting, reducing
to a 16-bit hardware multiplier. This sub-quadword size is suitable for SIMD operations on
media-like data streams like those expected in a PS3 multimedia application. For larger size
integer operations it takes a slight re-factoring to get the most efficient throughput. This
is how standard multi-precision number manipulation is done in all cryptography libraries,
however, in this case, we can take advantage of the parallel nature of the SIMD.
7.2.1 Behind a 64-bit Multiply
In C/C++ for example, using a MADD() with the largest type causes overflow, with the most
significant half of the bits being discarded causing a subsequent loss in integrity. There are
numerous techniques to overcome this issue when using the basic C/C++ types but most
2
2256 − 189 = 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639747
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are relatively inefficient.
We present an efficient 64× 64-bit multiplier with full integrity, running at nearly twice
the speed of the most commonly used alternative. This new multiplier still uses the limiting
16-bit hardware multiplier in the SPU but takes full advantage of the Cell SPU’s large
register file.
As the basic multiplier is 16-bit by 16-bit, the most efficient method for a× b (64× 64-
bit) multiply is to break it down into 16-bit ( sub-words) arranged as such a3, a2, a1, a0. For
a× b is broken down to 4× 16-bit values using the standard school book multiply described
above and outlined in the documentation of MIRACL [84].
a3 a2 a1 a0
x b3 b2 b1 b0
a3.b0 a2.b0 a1.b0 a0.b0
a3.b1 a2.b1 a1.b1 a0.b1
a3.b2 a2.b2 a1.b2 a0.b2
a3.b3 a2.b3 a1.b3 a0.b3
The first line (a3.b0 a2.b0 a1.b0 a0.b0) can be calculated by re-arranging (shuﬄing) a in
the 128-bit register as (0|a3|0|a2|0|a1|0|a0) and multiplying this by (0|b0|0|b0|0|b0|0|b0)
0 a3 0 a2 0 a1 0 a0
x 0 b0 0 b0 0 b0 0 b0
a3.b0 a2.b0 a1.b0 a0.b0
This results in (a3.b0|a2.b0|a1.b0|a0.b0), 4 32-bit partial products, which is the first line,
as required. Next, we calculate and store in registers the next 3 lines in exactly the same
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way. We then add the lines and propagate the carries.
Each line can be considered as (3H|3L|2H|2L|1H|1L|0H|0L) (H=high, L=low) For the
first line, shuﬄe this into two registers as (0|0|0|0|3L|2L|1L|0L) and (0|0|0|3H|2H|1H|0H|0)
The sum of these two registers and the 3 other pairs of registers produce the final result
(shifting over by one place each time)
00 00 00 00 3L 2L 1L 0L
+ 00 00 00 3H 2H 1H 0H 00
+ 00 00 00 3L 2L 1L 0L 00
+ 00 00 3H 2H 1H 0H 00 00
+ 00 00 3L 2L 1L 0L 00 00
+ 00 3H 2H 1H 0H 00 00 00
+ 00 3L 2L 1L 0L 00 00 00
+ 3H 2H 1H 0H 00 00 00 00
The optimised SPU intrinsics code for is this can be viewed in listing 3 in Appendix B.
7.3 Implementation
7.3.1 ECC Performance Bottleneck
The performance bottleneck we focus on is the elliptic curve scalar multiplication. This
is implemented using a sequence of point addition and point doubling operations. These
in turn are implemented via a sequence of modular multiplication, squaring, addition and
subtractions. It is these ‘low layer‘ routines that we implement as multi-precision routines
using the SPU intrinsics to get maximum performance from the SPU core.
7.3.2 Approach
Since our goal is to speed up a standard PPU implementation, we first implement a fast, C
based, 64-bit multiply routine to act as our benchmark. Subsequently, we optimise scalar
multiplication at the w-core level by implementing the 64-bit multiply using SPU intrinsics.
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Then, we move up a layer and use modular arithmetic routines provided by the MPM library.
Finally, we remove some inefficiency inside MPM by unrolling loops & removing branches
with MPM derived code for fixed sized 256-bit modular routines. We take a number of
standard approaches, each improving on the last. Separately, we built a test script using
bash and the GNU bc calculator which could test the integrity at each stage.
64-bit Multiply in C
IBM have published an efficient 64-bit multiply implementation utilising [57], suitable for
the PowerPC family of processors. See [17] for details and listing.
compiler cycles instructions CPI M / sec
spu-gcc 223 170 (153) 1.31 (1.46) 14.314
Table 7.1: 64-bit multiply in C. Million Multiplies per second
64-bit Multiply using SPU intrinsics in an inline function
In order to help the compiler achieve optimal code, we apply the SDK cycle accurate
simulator and additional code analysis tools. For example, as the SPU pipelines are not
equal, with operations using a pipe based on the instruction class we examine the SPU
intrinsics code using the SPU timing tool and a pipe depth/dependency table. All integer
operations use an even pipe while the load/stores use the odd pipeline. Carefully interleaving
of the instructions improves the Cycles Per Instruction (CPI) ratio. Note there are two
pipelines, but as as the pipelines are not equal, it is difficult to achieve an optimal 0.5 CPI.
The SDK documentation cites a more reasonable goal of 0.7.
The SPU is interesting in that while it can do one clock cycle parallel operation, it is
relatively inefficient for load / store operations. Branches, in particular, incur long stall
delays. Optimal code limits the amount of movement in and out of registers, and attempts
to flow without ifs, loops, and function calls. To overcome these overheads we use the C
pre-processor to our advantage by:
1. Declaring the vector splat patterns as constant globals.
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2. Loading the 64-bit multipliers into two half’s of a 128-bit vector saving a load().
3. Manually in-lining the full multiply code in a C header file via macros to save a
function call branch, effectively in-lining the C code.
4. Removing loops (unrolling) by manually expanding the vector access rather than
processing via traditional arrays.
See Appendix B listing for code sample. If we implement the school book algorithm in the
most basic fashion where we naively carry out each step of the algorithm but take advantage
of the SIMD we get nearly double throughput.
compiler cycles instructions CPI M / sec
spu-gcc 107 108 (102) 0.99 (1.05) 29.831
Table 7.2: SPU intrinsics. Million Multiplies per second
64-bit Multiply in SPU intrinsics. C Macro
Taking the code one step further, aware that the Cell SPU stalls badly if it incurs branches,
we re-code this as a C macro, moving some constants out and eliminating the function call
branch and we achieve a further gain of about 20%. See Appendix B listing for code sample.
complier cycles instructions CPI M / sec
spu-gcc 89 96 (92) 0.93 (097) 35.865
Table 7.3: C Macro. Million Multiplies per second
7.3.3 Automatic Code Generation
For future reuse, rather than fixing our library at 256-bit, and following on from the expe-
rience of hand unrolling the MPM multiply routines, we developed an automated method
based on code-to-code compiling/code generation techniques for MIRACL.
We used the multiple-precision multiplication algorithm from [67] (Chapter 14 of Section
14.2.3) but we automated the code unrolling to limit the chance of errors which could
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otherwise be introduced by manual methods such as cut and paste, i.e: hard to debug
errors introduced by the excessive code unrolling and index de-referencing. We implemented
a Ruby script to parse C code and do inline substitutions replacing C defines (e.g such as
MADD(N,a,b,c)) with fully unrolled code to calculate N-bit a × b + c. This a × b + c is
based around an optimal 64-bit multiply function created by examining the instruction
dependencies using the SPU timing tool from the SDK where we minimised the number of
loadstore operations and removed all loops and arrays (and array de-referencing).
See B for the Ruby code, a generated 256-bit example, and the fully optimised 64-bit
multiplier.
7.3.4 Using MPM
256-bit mod multiply using MPM
The MPM library provides a number of options such as an alternative modular exponenti-
ation function which uses the Montgomery reduction technique. This is more efficient than
the classic multiply then reduce modulo N approach as it keeps the numbers from growing
unnecessarily. See [67] (Chapter 14). Note that by adding the MPM library to the test
harness we now have the issue of switching big number formats between those used natively
by MIRACL and MPM.
256-bit mod multiply using optimised MPM
MPM doesn’t provide a square() function which is used by the ECC point doubling routines.
Significant optimisations can be made over a multiply if the operands are equal as one can
reuse SIMD partial products saving expensive multiply calls.
The MPM library is provided in source code and is generic for arbitrary size numbers.
But as we know we need 256-bit (and some 512-bit) numbers, we can help the compiler by
providing some domain knowledge and modify the library by editing the source to manually
unroll loops and removing branches.
The MPM multiply function, at a pseudo-high level, follows a pattern of (Algorithm
7.1)
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Algorithm 7.1 MPM Multiply function
INPUT: A[N ], B[N ]
OUTPUT: Result[2 ∗N ]
Variables Declaration as array [0..N ]
Initialise Variables [0 to N ]
for Outer Loop 0 to N do
for Inner Loop to 0 to N do
end for
end for
Gather results [0 to N ]
For 256-bit ECC we can unroll this to a pattern (Algorithm 7.2)
Algorithm 7.2 MPM Multiply function 256-bit unrolled
INPUT: A[N ], B[N ]
OUTPUT: Result[2 ∗N ]
V ariables 1 2 3 4
Initialise 1 2 3 4
Outer1
Inner1
Inner2
Outer2
Inner1
Inner2
Gather 1 2 3 4
Using explicit variable naming as oppose to implicit array calls and fully unrolling the
loop helps both the GCC and IBM XLC compilers.
7.3.5 Results
Table 7.4 giving Performance of the ecurve mult()3
7.4 Branch Prediction
The SPU suffers a high penalty (18 cycles) for misdirected branching. To reduce penalties,
the SPU addresses branch prediction through a set of hint for branch (HBR) instructions
3Tests are run on a 3.2 GHz Playstation 3 with just 6 SPUs running Fedora 7 [77] with kernel version
2.6.21-1.3194.fc7.
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ticks pclocks micro secs
64-bit C 865318 34612720 10843.58
SPU 64-bit function() 823517 32940680 10319.76
SPU 64-bit define 788304 31532160 9878.50
SPU 256-bit unrolled 788304 31532160 9878.50
Standard MPM 618037 24721480 7744.82
Optimised 256-bit MPM 602956 24118240 7555.84
Table 7.4: Results
that facilitate efficient branch processing. At a higher level, the C/C++ Language Ex-
tensions for the Cell provide a builtin expect directive to allow programmers to predict
conditional program statements. For example (Listing 7.4) predicts the a is not larger than
b.
Listing 7.4: Simple branch prediction
i f ( b u i l t i n e x p e c t ( ( a>b ) , 0 ) )
c += a ;
e l s e
d += 1 ;
We implemented the prediction inside the code for our special-form moduli (2256− 189)
function where we can branch-predict the small, very unlikely, last check. See the
Montgomery-Multiplication-with-Reduction algorithm (See [27] Algorithm 9.2.13 and Chap-
ter 2 Section C.0.4) (Fast mod operation for special/form moduli) where there is a simple
final check for overflow (if x >= N then x = x−N).
There is a problem with resolution of the run time timers on the PS3 (about 20 cycles)
versus the slow performance of the large number routines inside the cycle accurate simulator,
where the host environment is very slow to run the high computations required. This makes
it complex to get an accurate picture of the success of small improvements.
We observed that branch is taken roughly 1% of the time based on a few million random
inputs to the branch hint code and the prediction code just gives a relatively small, (>1%)
improvement.
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However the conditional subtract at the end of the algorithm also represents a side
channel weakness (See [23] Section 10.4.3). This small improvement is not worth the security
issue.
Listing 7.5: MIRACL code for (x reduced modulo 2256 − 189) with branch prediction
void nc mod256 ( MIPD big x , b ig y )
{
i n t i ;
b ig A,B;
mirac l ∗mr mip=get mip ( ) ;
char mem big [MR BIG RESERVE ( 2 ) ] ; /∗ we need 2 b i g s . . . ∗/
memset ( mem big , 0 ,MR BIG RESERVE( 2 ) ) ; /∗ c l e a r the memory ∗/
A=mirvar mem ( mr mip , mem big , 0 ) ; /∗ I n i t i a l i s e b i g numbers ∗/
copy (x , mr mip−>w0 ) ;
B=mirvar mem ( mr mip , mem big , 1 ) ;
i f ( b u i l t i n e x p e c t ( ( mr mip−>w0−>len >4) ,1)) //
i f ( mr mip−>w0−>len >4)
{
zero (A) ;
ze ro (B) ;
A−>l en=B−>l en =4;
f o r ( i =0; i <4; i++)
{
A−>w[ i ]=mr mip−>w0−>w[ i ] ;
B−>w[ i ]=mr mip−>w0−>w[4+ i ] ;
}
mr lzero (A) ;
mr lze ro (B) ;
/∗ A i s bottom h a l f ∗/ /∗ B i s top h a l f ∗/
premult ( MIPP B, 0xBD,B) ;
add ( MIPP A,B, mr mip−>w0 ) ;
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}
i f ( b u i l t i n e x p e c t ( ( mr mip−>w0−>len >4) ,1)) //
i f ( mr mip−>w0−>len >4)
{
zero (A) ;
A−>l en =1;
A−>w[0]= mr mip−>w0−>w [ 4 ] ;
mr lze ro (A) ;
ze ro (B) ;
B−>l en =4;
f o r ( i =0; i <4; i++)
{
B−>w[ i ]=mr mip−>w0−>w[ i ] ;
}
premult ( MIPP A, 0xBD,A) ;
add ( MIPP A,B, mr mip−>w0 ) ;
}
i f ( b u i l t i n e x p e c t ( ( compare ( mr mip−>w0 , mr mip−>modulus )==1) ,0)) //
i f ( compare ( mr mip−>w0 , mr mip−>modulus)==1)
{
subt rac t ( MIPP mr mip−>w0 , mr mip−>modulus , mr mip−>w0 ) ;
}
copy ( mr mip−>w0 , y ) ;
memset ( mem big , 0 ,MR BIG RESERVE( 2 ) ) ;
}
90
CHAPTER 7. UTILISING THE CELL’S SPU FOR ECC
7.5 Future Work
Recently, discussions on the IBM Cell developer forum have cast some doubt over the in-
tegrity of the MPM mod() functions. Researchers working at E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale
de Lausanne (EPFL) have found some cases where the reduction functions provided in-
correct results. The replacements offered by IBM appear to work; we have verified them
empirically. However, they do not seem, by examining source code, to be as efficient as the
original code. We intend to further examine the MPM source and swap in our own MPM
compatible routines.
We are still thunking formats between the upper layer (ECC) MIRACL code’s and the
MPM’s big number representation. Our observations, at 256-bit ECC, is that this is a 25%
overhead. Further work would be to attempt tying the large number representation inside
the ECC point multiply and addition algorithms in one format.
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Fast Elliptic-Curve Cryptography on the Cell
Broadband Engine
Background
Our work on ECC on the Cell (Chapter 7) introduced us to Dan Bernstein and the team from
Technische Universiteit, Eindhoven (TU/e). Bernstein has been championing an elliptic
curve (curve25519) which has slightly less security level than standard 256-bit curves but
is very suitable for reduced representation implementations. These reduced representations
would, for example, be able to do addition without any processing of a carry. Our work
with Peter Scwabe exploited these efficiencies on the Cells SPU and, for a time at least,
achieved speed records for ECC.
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a high-speed implementation of elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) key exchange for the Cell, which needs 697080 cycles on one SPU for a scalar
multiplication on a 255-bit elliptic curve, including the costs for key verification and key
compression. This cycle count is independent of inputs therefore protecting against timing
attacks.
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This speed relies on a new representation of elements of the underlying finite field suited
for the unconventional instruction set of this architecture.
We also demonstrate that an implementation based on the multi-precision integer arith-
metic functions provided by IBM’s multi-precision math (MPM) library (Chapter 7 Section
7.1.2) and [51]) would take at least 2227040 cycles.
Comparison with implementations of the same function for other architectures shows
that the Cell is competitive in terms of cost-performance ratio to other recent processors
such as the Intel Core 2 for public-key cryptography.
Specifically, the state-of-the-art Galbraith-Lin-Scott ECDH software performs 27370
scalar multiplications per second when using all four cores of a 2.5GHz Intel Core 2 Quad
Q9300 inside a $296 computer 1, while the new software reported in this Chapter performs
27474 scalar multiplications per second on a Playstation 3 that costs just $221. Both of
these speed reports are for high-security 256-bit elliptic-curve cryptography.
This chapter describes a high-speed implementation of state-of-the-art public-key cryp-
tography for the Cell Broadband Engine (CBE). More specifically we describe an implemen-
tation of the curve25519 function, an elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (ECDH)
function introduced in [9].
Implementations of this function have been achieving speed records for high-security
ECDH software on different platforms for example [9] and [40]. Benchmarks of our im-
plementation show that the CBE is competitive (in terms of cost-performance ratio) with
respect to other recent processors such as the Intel Core 2 for public-key cryptography.
Our implementation needs 697080 cycles on one SPU. This includes not only scalar mul-
tiplication on the underlying 255-bit elliptic curve, but also costs for key compression, key
validation and protection against timing attacks. We put our implementation into the pub-
lic domain to maximize the impact of our research. It is available as part of the SUPERCOP
benchmarking suite [10] and at http://cryptojedi.org/crypto/index.shtml#celldh.
1prices quoted use an internet search for cheapest source using google product search April 09
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8.1.1 How these speeds were achieved
As described in (Chapter 7 Section 7.1.3) elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) is usually
implemented as a sequence of arithmetic operations in a finite field. Chapter 7 described
the obvious approach for the implementation of ECC on the CBE is using the IBM-MPM
or MIRACL libraries for the underlying finite field arithmetic.
However, we will show that the targeted performance cannot be achieved following this
approach, not even with optimizing some functions of the MPM library for arithmetic in
fields of the desired size.
Instead, the speed of our implementation is achieved by
• Parting with the traditional way of implementing elliptic-curve cryptography which
uses arithmetic operations in the underlying field as smallest building blocks,
• Representing finite field elements in a way that takes into account the special structure
of the finite field and the unconventional SPU instruction set, and
• Careful optimization of the code at assembly level.
Related work Implementations of public-key cryptography for the Cell Broadband En-
gine have not yet been extensively studied. In particular we don’t know of any previous
implementation of ECC for the Cell Broadband Engine.
An implementation of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) supporting key lengths
up to 1024 bits is included in the SPE Cryptographic Library [52].
In [89] Shimizu et al. report 4074000 cycles for 1024-bit-RSA encryption or decryption
and 1331000 cycles for 1024-bit-DSA key generation. Furthermore they report 2250000
cycles for 1024-bit-DSA signature generation and 4375000 cycles for 1024-bit-DSA signature
verification.
The Cell Broadband Engine has recently demonstrated its power for cryptanalysis of
symmetric cryptographic primitives [93], [92].
Organization of the Chapter Section 8.2 describes the curve25519 function including
some necessary background on elliptic-curve arithmetic. Chapter 7 describes IBM’s MPM
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library including optimizations we applied to accelerate arithmetic in finite fields of the
desired size. We show that an implementation based on this library cannot achieve the
targeted performance. In Section 8.4 we detail our implementation of curve25519. We
conclude the Chapter with a discussion of benchmarking results and a comparison to ECDH
implementations for other architectures in Section 8.5.
8.2 The curve25519 function
8.2.1 The curve25519 function
Bernstein proposed in [9] the curve25519 function for elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key
exchange. This function uses arithmetic on the elliptic curve defined by the equation E :
y2 = x3 +Ax2 + x over the field Fp, where p = 2255− 19 and A = 486662; observe that this
elliptic curve allows for the x-coordinate-based scalar multiplication described above.
The elliptic curve and underlying finite field are carefully chosen to meet high security
requirements and to allow for fast implementation, For a detailed discussion of the security
properties of curve25519 see [9].
The curve25519 function takes as input two 32-byte strings, one representing the x-
coordinate of a point P and the other representing a 256-bit scalar k. It gives as output
a 32-byte string representing the x-coordinate xQ of Q = [k]P . For each of these values
curve25519 is assuming little-endian representation.
For our implementation we decided to follow [9] and compute xQ by first using Algorithm
2.1 to compute (XQ, ZQ) and then computing xQ = Z
−1
Q ·XQ.
8.3 The MPM library and ECC
8.3.1 Fp arithmetic using the MPM library
In Section 8.2 we described how the upper 3 layers of this hierarchy are handled. Hence, the
obvious next step is to look at efficient modular operations in Fp and how these operations
can be mapped to the SIMD instructions on 128-bit registers of the SPU.
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This task of mapping operations on large integers to the SPU instruction set, is handled
by the vector-optimized multi-precision math (MPM) library [51].
This MPM library is provided in source code and its algorithms are generic for arbitrary
sized numbers. They operate on 16-bit halfwords as smallest units, elements of our 255-bit
field are therefore actually handled as 256-bit values.
As our computation is mostly bottlenecked by costs for multiplications and squarings in
the finite field we decided to optimize these functions for 256-bit input values.
The original MPM multiplication functions were optimsized as outlined in (Chapter 7
Section 7.3.4)
While these manual unroll and branch hint techniques help both the GCC and IBM XLC
compilers it should be noted that, for this unrolled MPM code, the GCC-derived compiler
achieves a 10% improvement over the XLC compiler2.
The MPM library supplies a specialized function for squaring where significant opti-
mizations should be made over a general multiply by reusing partial products. However
our timings indicate that such savings are not achieved until the size of the multi-precision
inputs exceeds 512-bits. We therefore take the timings of a multiplication for a squaring.
8.3.2 What speed can we achieve using MPM?
The Montgomery ladder in the curve25519 computation consists of 255 ladder steps, hence,
computation takes 1276 multiplications, 1020 squarings, 255 multiplications with a constant,
2040 additions and one inversion in the finite field F2255−19. Table 8.1 gives the number of
CPU cycles required for each of these operations (except inversion).
For finite field multiplication and squaring we benchmarked two possibilities: a call
to mpm_mul followed by a call to mpm_mod and the Montgomery multiplication function
mpm_mont_mod_mul. Addition is implemented as a call to mpm_add and a conditional call
(mpm_cmpge) to mpm_sub. For multiplication we include timings of the original MPM func-
tions and of our optimized versions. The original MPM library offers a number of options
for each operation. We select the inlined option with equal input sizes for fair comparison.
2IBM XL C/C++ for Multicore Acceleration for Linux, V10.1. CBE SDK 3.1
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Operation Number of cycles
Addition/Subtraction 86
Multiplication (original MPM) 4334
Multiplication (optimized) 4124
Montgomery Multiplication (original MPM) 1197
Montgomery Multiplication (optimized) 892
Table 8.1: MPM performance for arithmetic operations in a 256-bit finite field
From these numbers we can compute a lower bound of 2227040 cycles (1276M + 1020S
+ 2040A, where M, S and A stand for the costs of multiplication, squaring and addition
respectively) required for the curve25519 computation when using MPM. Observe that this
lower bound still ignores costs for the inversion and for multiplication with the constant.
The high cost for modular reduction in these algorithms results from the fact that the
MPM library cannot make use of the special form of the modulus 2255 − 19; an improved
specialized reduction routine would probably yield a smaller lower bound. We therefore
investigate what lower bound we get when entirely ignoring costs for modular reduction.
Table 8.2 gives numbers of cycles for multiplication and addition of 256-bit integers without
modular reduction. This yields a lower bound of 934080 cycles. Any real implementation
would, of course, take significantly more time as it would need to account for operations
not considered in this estimation.
Operation Number of cycles
Addition/Subtraction 52
Multiplication (original MPM) 594
Multiplication (optimized) 360
Table 8.2: MPM performance for arithmetic operations on 256-bit integers
8.4 Implementation of curve25519
As described in Section 8.2 the computation of the curve25519 function consists of two
parts, the Montgomery ladder computing (XQ, ZQ) and the inversion of ZQ.
We decided to implement the inversion as an exponentiation with p−2 = 2255−21 using
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the same sequence of 254 squarings and 11 multiplications as [9]. This might not be the
most efficient algorithm for inversion, but it is the easiest way to implement an inversion
algorithm which takes constant time.
The addition chain is specialized for the particular exponent and cannot be implemented
as a simple square-and-multiply loop; completely inlining all multiplications and squarings
would result in an excessive increase of the overall code size. We therefore implement
multiplication and squaring functions and use calls to these functions.
However for the first part, the Montgomery ladder, we do not use calls to these functions
but take one ladder step as smallest building block and implement the complete Montgomery
ladder in one function. This allows for a higher degree of data-level parallelism, especially
in the modular reductions, and thus yields a significantly increased performance.
For the speed-critical parts of our implementation we use the qhasm programming lan-
guage ([8] and Chapter 7 Section 7.1.2), which offers us all flexibility for code optimization
at assembly level, while still supporting a more convenient development environment than
plain assembly. We extended this language to also support the SPU of the Cell Broadband
Engine as target architecture.
In the description of our implementation we will use the term ‘register variable‘. Note
that for qhasm (unlike C) the term register variable refers to variables that are forced to be
kept in registers.
8.4.1 Fast arithmetic
In the following section we will first describe how we represent elements of the finite field
F2255−19 and then detail the three algorithms that influence execution speed of curve25519
most, namely finite field multiplications, finite field squaring and a Montgomery ladder step.
8.4.2 Representing elements of F2255−19
We represent an element a of F2255−19 as a tuple (a0, . . . , a19) where
a =
19∑
i=0
ai2
d12.75ie. (8.1)
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We call a coefficient ai reduced if ai ∈ [0, 213 − 1]. Analogously we call the representation
of an element a ∈ F2255−19 reduced if all its coefficients a0, . . . , a19 are reduced.
As described in section (Chapter 5 Section 5.2) the Cell Broadband Engine can only
perform 16-bit integer multiplication, where one instruction performs 4 such multiplications
in parallel. In order to achieve high performance of finite field arithmetic it is crucial to
properly arrange the values a0, . . . a19 in registers and to adapt algorithms for field arithmetic
to make use of this SIMD capability.
Multiplication and Squaring in F2255−19
As input to field multiplication we get two finite field elements (a0, . . . , a19) and (b0, . . . , b19).
We assume that these field elements are in reduced representation. This input is arranged
in 10 register variables a03, a47, a811, a1215, a1619, b03, b47, b811, b1215 and b1619
as follows: Register variable a03 contains in its word elements the coefficients a0, a1, a2, a3,
register variable a47 contains in its word elements the coefficients a4, a5, a6, a7, and so on.
The idea of multiplication is to compute coefficients r0, . . . , r38 of r = ab where:
r0 =a0b0
r1 =a1b0 + a0b1
r2 =a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2
r3 =a3b0 + a2b1 + a1b2 + a0b3
r4 =a4b0 + 2a3b1 + 2a2b2 + 2a1b3 + a0b4
r5 =a5b0 + a4b1 + 2a3b2 + 2a2b3 + a1b4 + a0b5
r6 =a6b0 + a5b1 + a4b2 + 2a3b3 + a2b4 + a1b5 + a0b6
r7 =a7b0 + a6b1 + a5b2 + a4b3 + a3b4 + a2b5 + a1b6 + a0b7
r8 =a8b0 + 2a7b1 + 2a6b2 + 2a5b3 + a4b4 + 2a3b5 + 2a2b6 + 2a1b7 + a0b8
...
This computation requires 400 multiplications and 361 additions. Making use of the
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SIMD instructions, at best 4 of these multiplications can be done in parallel, adding the
result of a multiplication is at best for free using the mpya instruction, so we need at least
100 instructions to compute the coefficients r0, . . . , r38. Furthermore we need to multiply
some intermediate products by 2, an effect resulting from the non-integer radix 12.75 used
for the representation of finite field elements. As we assume the inputs to have reduced
coefficients, all result coefficients ri fit into 32-bit word elements.
We will now describe how the coefficients r0, . . . , r38 can be computed using 145 pipeline-
0 instructions (arithmetic instructions). This computation requires some rearrangement of
coefficients in registers using the shufb instruction but with careful instruction scheduling
and alignment these pipeline-1 instructions do not increase the number of cycles needed for
multiplication. From the description of the arithmetic instructions it should be clear which
rearrangement of inputs is necessary.
First use 15 shl instructions to have register variables
b03s1 containing b0, b1, b2, 2b3,
b03s2 containing b0, b1, 2b2, 2b3,
b03s3 containing b0, 2b1, 2b2, 2b3,
b47s1 containing b4, b5, b6, 2b7 and so on.
Now we can proceed producing intermediate result variables
r03 containing a0b0, a0b1, a0b2, a0b3 (one mpy instruction),
r14 containing a1b0, a1b1, a1b2, 2a1b3 (one mpy instruction),
r25 containing a2b0, a2b1, 2a2b2, 2a2b3 (one mpy instruction),
r36 containing a3b0, 2a3b1, 2a3b2, 2a3b3 (one mpy instruction),
r47 containing a4b0 + a0b4, a4b1 + a0b5, a4b2 + a0b6, a4b3 + a0b7 (one mpy and one mpya
instruction),
r58 containing a5b0 + a1b4, a5b1 + a1b5, a5b2 + a1b6, 2a5b3 + 2a1b7 (one mpy and one mpya
instruction) and so on. In total these computations need 36 mpy and 64 mpya instructions.
As a final step these intermediate results have to be joined to produce the coefficients
r0, . . . r38 in the register variables r03, r47,. . . r3639. We can do this using 30 additions
if we first combine intermediate results using the shufb instruction. For example we join
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in one register variable the highest word of r14 and the three lowest words of r58 before
adding this register variable to r47.
The basic idea for squaring is the same as for multiplication. We can make squaring
slightly more efficient by exploiting the fact that some intermediate results are equal.
For a squaring of a value a given in reduced representation (a0, . . . , a19), formulas for
the result coefficients r0, . . . , r38 are the following:
r0 =a0a0
r1 =2a1a0
r2 =2a2a0 + a1a1
r3 =2a3a0 + 2a2a1
r4 =2a4a0 + 4a3a1 + 2a2a2
r5 =2a5a0 + 2a4a1 + 4a3a2
r6 =2a6a0 + 2a5a1 + 2a4a2 + 2a3a3
r7 =2a7a0 + 2a6a1 + 2a5a2 + 2a4a3
r8 =2a8a0 + 4a7a1 + 4a6a2 + 4a5a3 + a4a4
...
The main part of the computation only requires 60 multiplications (24 mpya and 36
mpy instructions). However, some partial results have to be multiplied by 4; this requires
more preprocessing of the inputs, we end up using 35 instead of 15 shl instructions before
entering the main block of multiplications. Squaring is therefore only 20 cycles faster than
multiplication.
During both multiplication and squaring, we can overcome latencies by interleaving
independent instructions.
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8.4.3 Reduction
The task of the reduction step is to compute from the coefficients r0, . . . r38 a reduced
representation (r0, . . . , r19). Implementing this computation efficiently is challenging in
two ways: In a typical reduction chain every instruction is dependent on the result of the
preceding instruction. This makes it very hard to vectorize operations in SIMD instructions
and to minimise latencies.
We will now describe a way to handle reduction hiding most instruction latencies but
without data level parallelism through SIMD instructions.
The basic idea of reduction is to first reduce the coefficients r20 to r38 (producing a
coefficient r39), then add 19r20 to r0, 19r21 to r1 and so on until adding 19r39 to r19 and
then reduce the coefficients r0 to r19.
Multiplications by 19 result from the fact that the coefficient a20 stands for a20 · 2255
(see equation (8.1)). By the definition of the finite field F2255−19, 2255a20 is the same as
19a20. Equivalent statements hold for the coefficients a21, . . . , a39.
The most time consuming parts of this reduction are the two carry chains from r20 to
r39 and from r0 to r19. In order to overcome latencies in these chains we break each of
them into four parallel carry chains, Algorithm 8.1 describes this structure of our modular
reduction algorithm.
Each of the carry operations in Algorithm 8.1 can be done using one shufb, one rotmi
and one a instruction. Furthermore we need 8 masking instructions (bitwise and) for each
of the two carry chains.
In total, a call to the multiplication function (including reduction) takes 444 cycles, a
call to the squaring function takes 424 cycles. This includes 144 cycles for multiplication
(124 cycles for squaring), 244 cycles for reduction and some more cycles to load input and
store output. Furthermore the cost of a function call is included in these numbers.
Montgomery ladder step
For the implementation of a Montgomery ladder step we exploit the fact that we can op-
timize a fixed sequence of arithmetic instructions in F2255−19 instead of single instructions.
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Algorithm 8.1 Structure of the modular reduction
Carry from r20 to r21, from r24 to r25, from r28 to r29 and from r32 to r33
Carry from r21 to r22, from r25 to r26, from r29 to r30 and from r33 to r34
Carry from r22 to r23, from r26 to r27, from r30 to r31 and from r34 to r35
Carry from r23 to r24, from r27 to r28, from r31 to r32 and from r35 to r36
Carry from r24 to r25, from r28 to r29, from r32 to r33 and from r36 to r37
Carry from r25 to r26, from r29 to r30, from r33 to r34 and from r37 to r38
Carry from r26 to r27, from r30 to r31, from r34 to r35 and from r38 to r39
Carry from r27 to r28, from r31 to r32 and from r35 to r36
Add 19r20 to r0, add 19r21 to r1, add 19r22 to r2 and add 19r23 to r3
Add 19r24 to r4, add 19r25 to r5, add 19r26 to r6 and add 19r27 to r7
Add 19r28 to r8, add 19r29 to r9, add 19r30 to r10 and add 19r31 to r11
Add 19r32 to r12, add 19r33 to r13, add 19r34 to r14 and add 19r35 to r15
Add 19r36 to r16, add 19r37 to r17, add 19r38 to r18 and add 19r39 to r19
Carry from r16 to r17, from r17 to r18, from r18 to r19 and from r19 to r20
Add 19r20 to r0
Carry from r0 to r1, from r4 to r5, from r8 to r9 and from r12 to r13
Carry from r1 to r2, from r5 to r6, from r9 to r10 and from r13 to r14
Carry from r2 to r3, from r6 to r7, from r10 to r11 and from r14 to r15
Carry from r3 to r4, from r7 to r8, from r11 to r12 and from r15 to r16
Carry from r4 to r5, from r8 to r9, from r12 to r13 and from r16 to r17
Carry from r5 to r6, from r9 to r10, from r13 to r14 and from r17 to r18
Carry from r6 to r7, from r10 to r11, from r14 to r15 and from r18 to r19
Carry from r7 to r8, from r11 to r12 and from r15 to r16
This makes it much easier to make efficient use of the SIMD instruction set, in particular,
for modular reduction.
The idea is to arrange the operations in F2255−19 into blocks of 4 equal or similar in-
structions, similar meaning that multiplications and squarings can be grouped together and
additions and subtractions can be grouped together as well. Then these operations can be
carried out using the 4-way parallel SIMD instructions in the obvious way; for example for
4 multiplications r = a · b, s = c · d, t = e · f and u = g ·h we first produce register variables
aceg0 containing in its word elements a0, c0, e0, g0 and bdgh0 containing b0, d0, e0, g0 and so
on. Then the first coefficient of r, s, t and u can be computed by applying the mpy instruc-
tion on aceg0 and bdfh0. All other result coefficients of r, s, t and u can be computed in a
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similar way using mpy and mpya instructions.
This way of using the SIMD capabilities of CPUs was introduced in [42] as ‘digit-slicing‘.
In our case it not only makes multiplication slightly faster (420 arithmetic instructions
instead of 576 for 4 multiplications), it also allows for much faster reduction: The reduction
algorithm described above can now be applied to 4 results in parallel, reducing the cost of
a reduction by a factor of 4.
In Algorithm 8.2 we describe how we divide a Montgomery ladder step into blocks of
4 similar operations. In this algorithm the computation of ZP+Q in the last step requires
one multiplication and reduction which we carry out as described in the previous section.
The computation of a ladder step again requires rearrangement of data in registers using
the shufb instruction. Again we can hide these pipeline-1 instructions almost entirely by
interleaving with arithmetic pipeline-0 instructions.
One remark regarding subtractions occurring in this computation: As reduction expects
all coefficients to be larger than zero, we cannot just compute the difference of each coeffi-
cient. Instead, for the subtraction a− b we first add 2p to a and then subtract b. For blocks
containing additions and subtractions in Algorithm 8.2 we compute the additions together
with additions of 2p and perform the subtraction in a separate step.
In total one call to the ladder-step function takes 2433 cycles.
8.5 Results and Comparison
8.5.1 Benchmarking Methodology
In order to make our benchmarking results comparable and verifiable we use the SU-
PERCOP toolkit, a benchmarking framework developed within eBACS, the benchmarking
project of ECRYPT II [10]. The software presented in this Chapter passes the extensive tests
of this toolkit showing compatibility to other curve25519 implementations, in particular the
reference implementation included in the toolkit.
For scalar multiplication software, SUPERCOP measures two different cycle counts:
The crypto_scalarmult benchmark measures cycles for a scalar multiplication of an arbi-
104
CHAPTER 8. FAST ELLIPTIC-CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY ON THE CELL
BROADBAND ENGINE
Algorithm 8.2 Structure of a Montgomery ladder step (see Algorithm 2.2) optimized for
4-way parallel computation
t1 ← XP + ZP
t2 ← XP − ZP
t3 ← XQ + ZQ
t4 ← XQ − ZQ
Reduce t1, t2, t2, t3
t6 ← t21
t7 ← t22
t8 ← t4 · t1
t9 ← t3 · t2
Reduce t6, t7, t8, t9
t10 = a24 · t6
t11 = (a24− 1) · t7
t5 ← t6 − t7
t4 ← t10 − t11
t1 ← t8 − t9
t0 ← t8 + t9
Reduce t5, t4, t1, t0
Z[2]P ← t5 · t4
XP+Q ← t20
X[2]P ← t6 · t7
t2 ← t21
Reduce Z[2]P , XP+Q, X[2]P , t2
ZP+Q ← XQ−P · t2
Reduce ZP+Q
trary point; the crypto_scalarmult_base benchmark measures cycles needed for a scalar
multiplication of a fixed base point.
We currently implement crypto_scalarmult_base as crypto_scalarmult; faster imple-
mentations would be useful in applications that frequently call
crypto_scalarmult_base.
Two further benchmarks regard our curve25519 software in the context of Diffie-
Hellman key exchange: The crypto_dh_keypair benchmark measures the number of cycles
to generate a key pair consisting of a secret and a public key. The crypto_dh benchmark
measures cycles to compute a joint key, given a secret and a public key.
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8.5.2 Results
We benchmarked our software on hex01, a QS21 blade containing two 3200 MHz Cell
Broadband Engine processors (revision 5.1) at the Chair for Operating Systems at RWTH
Aachen University. We also benchmarked the software on node001, a QS22 blade at the
Research Center Ju¨lich containing two 3200 MHz PowerXCell 8i processors (Cell Broadband
Engine (revision 48.0)). Furthermore we benchmarked the software on cosmovoid, a Sony
Playstation 3 containing a 3192 MHz Cell Broadband Engine processor (revision 5.1) located
at the Chair for Operating Systems at RWTH Aachen University. All measurements used
one SPU of one CBE.
SUPERCOP benchmark hex01 node001 cosmovoid
crypto_scalarmult 697080 697080 697040
crypto_scalarmult_base 697080 697080 697080
crypto_dh_keypair 720120 720120 720200
crypto_dh 697080 697080 697040
Table 8.3: Cycle counts of our software on different machines
8.5.3 Comparison
To give an impression of the power of the Cell Broadband Engine for asymmetric cryptog-
raphy we compare our results on a cost-performance basis with ECDH software for Intel
processors.
For this comparison we consider the cheapest hardware configuration containing a Cell
Broadband Engine, namely the Sony Playstation 3, and compare the results to an Intel-
Core-2-based configuration running the ECDH software presented in [39]. This is currently
the fastest implementation of ECDH for the Core 2 processor providing a similar security
as curve25519. Note that this software is not protected against timing attacks.
SUPERCOP reports 365363 cycles for the crypto_dh benchmark (this software is not
benchmarked as scalar-multiplication software). Key-pair generation specializes the scalar
multiplication algorithm for the known basepoint; the crypto_dh_keypair benchmark re-
ports 151215 cycles.
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To estimate a price for a complete workstation including an Intel Core 2 Quad Q9300
processor we determined the lowest prices for processor, case, motherboard, memory, hard
disk and power supply from different online retailers using Google Product Search yielding
$296 (Mar 30, 2009).
To determine the best price for the Sony Playstation 3 we also used Google Product
Search. The currently (Mar 30, 2009) cheapest offer is $221 for the Playstation 3 with a 40
GB hard disk.
The Sony Playstation 3 makes 6 SPUs available for general purpose computations. Us-
ing our implementation running at 697080 cycles (crypto_dh on cosmovoid) on 6 SPUs
operating at 3192MHz yields 27474 curve25519 computations per second. Taking the $221
market price for the Playstation as a basis, the cheapest CBE-based hardware can thus
perform 124 computations of curve25519 per second per dollar.
The Q9300-based workstation has 4 cores operating at 2.5GHz, using the above-
mentioned implementation which takes 365363 cycles, we can thus perform 27368 joint-key
computations per second. Taking $296 market price for a Q9300-based workstation as a
basis, the cheapest Core-2-based hardware can thus perform 92 joint-key computations per
second per dollar.
Note, that this comparison is not fair in several ways: The cheapest Q9300-based work-
station has for example more memory than the Playstation 3 (1GB instead of 256MB).
On the other hand we only use the 6 SPUs of the CBE for the curve25519 computation,
the PPU is still available for other tasks, whereas the performance estimation for the Core-
2-based system assumes 100% workload on all CPU cores.
Furthermore hardware prices are subject to frequent changes and different price-
performance ratios are achieved for other Intel or AMD processors.
In any case the above figures demonstrate that the Cell Broadband Engine, when used
properly, is one of the best available CPUs for public-key cryptography.
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Glossary
ADC Add with Carry
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
Altivec Floating point and integer SIMD instruction set designed and owned by Apple
BDH Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
CDH computational Diffie-Hellman
CPI Cycles per instruction
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
DDH Decision Diffie-Hellman
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie?Hellman
DLP Discrete logarithm problem
DMA Direct memory access
ECC Elliptic curve cryptography
ECDH Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange
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ELF Executable and Linkable Format
GCHQ UK Government Communications Headquarters
GMP Gnu Multi Precision
GPU Graphics Processing Unit
HSM Hardware security module
IBE Identity Base Encryption
ICHEC Irish Centre for High-End Computing
IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm
IpSec Internet Protocol Security
KDC Key Distribution Centre
LS Local Store
MADDU Multiply and Add Unsigned
MIPS Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipeline Stages
MIRACL Multi-precision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C/C++ Library
MPM IBM multi-precision library
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NTL Number Theory Library
OpenSSL Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
POSIX Portable Operating System Interface
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PPC PowerPC Performance Optimisation With Enhanced RISC Performance Computing
PPU Power Processor Unit
RISC Reduced Instruction Set Computer
RSA Public key algorithm invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
S/Mime Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
SIMD Single Instruction, Multiple Data.
SPU Synergistic Processing Unit
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Sockets layer
VPN Virtual Private Network
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Code Generation
The Ruby script in Listing B.1 is used to parse C/C++ files.
Listing B.1: Ruby code for multi-precision multiply
r e q u i r e "ftools"
u n l e s s ARGV[ 0 ]
p r i n t "mmadd.gen usage: maddgen file.c file.c\n"
e x i t
end
de f expand madd (nn , a , b , c )
n = (nn/64)−1
f o r i in ( 0 . . n )
p r i n t "\n\ncarry=0;\n"
f o r j in ( 0 . . n )
# mu l t i p l y each d i g i t o f y by x [ i ] #
# z [ i+j ] , carry = ( x [ i ]∗ y [ i ] + carry + z [ i+j ] ) #
pr in t "muldvd2_v(_x[#{i}],_y[#{j}],&carry ,&_z[#{i+j}]);\n"
end
pr in t "_z[#{n+i+1}]=carry;\n"
end
end
fh = F i l e . open ( ARGV[ 0 ] ) t ex t = fh . read ( ) fh . c l o s e
t ext . gsub ! ( /(MADD\ ( ) ( . ∗ ? ) (\b\d+\b) (\b\d+\b) (\b\d+\b ) ( \ ) ; \ n)/m ) {
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expand madd ( $2 . t o i , $3 , $4 , $5 )
}
The C/C++ code listed in B.2 holds tokens such as MADD.
Listing B.2: C code to be parsed
{
MADD(256 5 6 7 ) ;
}
Expands to produce the C code in Listing B.3
Listing B.3: Generated 256-bit multiply as C code
{
car ry =0;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 0 ] , y [0 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 0 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 0 ] , y [1 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 1 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 0 ] , y [2 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 2 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 0 ] , y [3 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 3 ] ) ;
z [4 ]= carry ;
car ry =0;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 1 ] , y [0 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 1 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 1 ] , y [1 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 2 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 1 ] , y [2 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 3 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 1 ] , y [3 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 4 ] ) ;
z [5 ]= carry ;
car ry =0;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 2 ] , y [0 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 2 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 2 ] , y [1 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 3 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 2 ] , y [2 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 4 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 2 ] , y [3 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 5 ] ) ;
z [6 ]= carry ;
car ry =0;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 3 ] , y [0 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 3 ] ) ;
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muldvd2 v ( x [ 3 ] , y [1 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 4 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 3 ] , y [2 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 5 ] ) ;
muldvd2 v ( x [ 3 ] , y [3 ] ,& carry ,& z [ 6 ] ) ;
z [7 ]= carry ;
r e turn 0 ;
Where muldvd_2_v() is a wrapper for a 64× 64-bit multiply core in Listing B.4
Listing B.4: 64-bit C code wrapper
#d e f i n e muldvd2 v ( a , b , c , rp ) \
{ \
AB=( vecto r unsigned shor t ) s p u i n s e r t ( a , ( vec to r unsigned long long )AB, 0 x1 ) ; \
AB=( vecto r unsigned shor t ) s p u i n s e r t ( b , ( vec to r unsigned long long )AB, 0 x0 ) ; \
C=( vecto r unsigned i n t ) s p u i n s e r t (∗ c , ( vec to r unsigned long long )C, 0 x01 ) ; \
SPU MULDVD2 V(AB,C,& r e s u l t ,∗ rp ) ; \
∗ rp=spu ext rac t ( ( ve c u l l ong2 ) r e s u l t , 0 x1 ) ; \
∗ c=spu ext rac t ( ( ve c u l l ong2 ) r e s u l t , 0 x0 ) ; \
}
and the code in Listing B.5 SPU_MULDVD2_V(); is unrolled and ordered for optimal
instruction ordering
Listing B.5: 64-bit multiply as spu intrinsic code unrolled and ordered
\ l s t s e t { l a b e l=code : : 6 4 bitUnRol led }
#d e f i n e SPU MULDVD2 V(AB,C, rp , usb ) \
{ \
rp v=( vec to r unsigned i n t ) s i f r o m u l l o n g ( usb ) ; \
rp v=spu rlmaskqwbyte ( rp v ,−8) ;\
b0=s p u s h u f f l e (AB,AB, s p l a t s h o r t 0 ) ; \
b1=s p u s h u f f l e (AB,AB, s p l a t s h o r t 1 ) ; \
A=s p u s h u f f l e (AB,AB, sp la t shor tA1 ) ; \
p0=spu mulo (A, b0 ) ; \
b2=s p u s h u f f l e (AB,AB, s p l a t s h o r t 2 ) ; \
p1=spu mulo (A, b1 ) ; \
b3=s p u s h u f f l e (AB,AB, s p l a t s h o r t 3 ) ; \
h0=s p u s h u f f l e ( p0 , p0 , sp la t shor tH0 ) ; \
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l 0=s p u s h u f f l e ( p0 , p0 , sp l a t sho r tL 0 ) ; \
p2=spu mulo (A, b2 ) ; \
p3=spu mulo (A, b3 ) ; \
MPM ADD FULL 2 CARRY(psum0 , l0 , h0 ) ; \
h1=s p u s h u f f l e ( p1 , p1 , sp la t shor tH1 ) ; \
l 1=s p u s h u f f l e ( p1 , p1 , sp l a t sho r tL 1 ) ; \
MPM ADD FULL 2 CARRY(psum1 , l1 , h1 ) ; \
h2=s p u s h u f f l e ( p2 , p2 , sp la t shor tH2 ) ; \
l 2=s p u s h u f f l e ( p2 , p2 , sp l a t sho r tL 2 ) ; \
MPM ADD FULL 2 CARRY(psum2 , l2 , h2 ) ; \
h3=s p u s h u f f l e ( p3 , p3 , sp la t shor tH3 ) ; \
l 3=s p u s h u f f l e ( p3 , p3 , sp l a t sho r tL 3 ) ; \
MPM ADD FULL 2 CARRY(psum3 , l3 , h3 ) ; \
MPM ADD FULL 1 CARRY(psum0 , psum0 , psum3 ) ; \
MPM ADD FULL 2 CARRY(psum1 , psum1 , psum2 ) ; \
MPM ADD FULL NO CARRY(psum0 , psum0 , psum1 ) ; \
MPM ADD FULL 2 CARRY(∗ rp , psum0 ,C) ; \
MPM ADD FULL 2 CARRY(∗ rp ,∗ rp , rp v ) ; \
}
with MPM_ADD_FULL_2_CARRY() in Listing B.6
Listing B.6: 128-bit vector added to 64 bit integer with optimal carry
#d e f i n e MPM ADD FULL 2 CARRY( out s , in a128 , i n a64 ) { \
c0 = spu genc ( in a128 , i n a64 ) ; \
sum = spu add ( in a128 , i n a64 ) ; \
t0 = spu s lqwbyte ( c0 , 4 ) ; \
c0 = spu genc ( sum , t0 ) ; \
sum = spu add ( sum , t0 ) ; \
t0 = spu s lqwbyte ( c0 , 4 ) ; \
o u t s = spu add ( sum , t0 ) ; \
}
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Multiple-precision Arithmetic
Computers have optimized operations (Compare, Add, Subtract, Bitwise Shift etc.) for
single-precision integers. We build on these operations to provide the required basic oper-
ations of Add, Subtract, Multiply and Squaring on non negative numbers. The underlying
algorithms outlined here are generally referred to as schoolbook methods and assume pos-
itive numbers. We assume the base b is the same. In practice, it is usually a power of 2
(28, 216, 232 etc.).
Multiple-precision Add
Algorithm C.1 Multiple-precision Addition
Input: x and y, where x has n+ 1 digits.
Output: w = x+ y, of size n+ 1 words.
1: carry ← 0.
2: for i from 0 to n do
3: wi ← (xi + yi + carry) mod b
4: if (xi + yi + carry) < b then carry ← 0 otherwise carry ← 1.
5: end for
6: wn+1 ← carry.
7: Return ((wn+1wn....w1w0)).
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Algorithm C.2 Multiple-precision Subtraction
Input: x and y, where x has n+ 1 digits and x ≥ y.
Output: w = x− y, of size n words.
1: carry ← 0.
2: for i from 0 to n do
3: wi ← (xi − yi + carry) mod b
4: if (xi − yi + carry) ≥ 0 then carry ← 0 otherwise carry ← −1.
5: end for
6: Return ((wnwn−1....w1w0)).
Multiple-precision Subtract
When working with integers of different lengths, we must pad the smaller number with 0s
to make them the same length.
Multiple-precision Multiplication
Algorithm C.3 Multiple-precision Multiplication
Input: x and y, where x has n+ 1 digits, and y has t+ 1 digits.
Output: w = x.y, of size n+ t words.
1: for i from 0 to (n+ t+ 1) do
2: wi ← 0.
3: end for
4: for i from 0 to t do
5: carry ← 0.
6: for j from 0 to n do
7: (uv)b ← wi+j + xj × yi + carry.
8: wi+j ← v.
9: carry ← u.
10: end for
11: wi+n+1 ← u.
12: end for
13: Return ((wn+t+1....w1w0)).
It is Step 7, the inner product operation, that is the computationally expensive opera-
tion. On some processors a special instruction exists to help accelerate this operation.
In some cases, the schoolbook method outlined in Algorithm C is not optimal. There
are a number of alternatives. One method, by Karatsuba [56], can be faster depending on
the size of the arguments and the underlying processor architecture.
Squaring is a special case of multiplication whereby inner product operation can be
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reused saving clock cycles.
Multiple-precision Squaring
Algorithm C.4 Multiple-precision Squaring
Input: x where x has t digits.
Output: w = x2, of size 2t words.
1: for i from 0 to (2t− 1) do
2: wi ← 0.
3: end for
4: for i from 0 to (t− 1) do
5: (uv)b ← w2i + xi × xi
6: w2i ← v,
7: carry ← u.
8: for j from (i+ 1) to (t− 1) do
9: (uv)b ← wi+j + 2xj × xi + carry,
10: wi+j ← v,
11: carry ← u.
12: end for
13: wi+n+1 ← u.
14: end for
15: Return ((w2t−1w2t−2....w1w0)).
Squaring takes only (n2 + n)/2 single-precision multiplications versus n2 for general
multiplications. In practice, Algorithm C is about 20% faster than the general multiplication
u× v (See [23] Section 10.3.3).
C.0.4 Modular reduction
Generally, we are more concerned with operations on the set of integers Z modulo m where
m is positive.
Modular addition and subtraction
Modular addition and subtraction are the simplest to perform. Subtraction is the same as
Algorithm C.2 if x ≥ y. If x and y non-negitive numbers with x, y > m then
1. x+ y > 2m;
2. if x ≥ y then 0 ≤ x− y < m; and
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3. if x < y then 0 ≤ x+m− y < m;
Modular Multiplication is more complex. The obvious algorithm is simply to calculate
the remainder on division by m (Algorithm C.0.4)
Algorithm C.5 Classic Modular Multiplication
Input: x and y and modulus m.
Output: x× y mod m
1: Compute x× y using Algorithm C
2: Compute remainder r when x× y is divided by m
3: Return ((r)).
Montgomery Reduction
Algorithm C.0.4 is not the most efficient method for multiply - reduction. Better algorithms
exist in which the steps of multiplication and reduction are interleaved. Furthermore Mont-
gomery [71], in 1985, introduced an algorithm that can derive the result without performing
a division by the modulus m. Montgomery used an ingenious representation of the residue
class modulo m. This algorithm replaces division by n operations with division by a power
of 2 which is extremely efficient on computers due to the numbers being represented in
binary form.
Modular reduction for moduli of special form
When the modulus has a special form that can make it easier to factor, that can be especially
chosen for efficient computation, we can employ yet another reduction algorithm.
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Algorithm C.6 Reduction modulo m = bt − c
Input: A base b, positive integer x, and a modulus m = bt − c, where c is an l-digit base b
integer for some l < t.
Output: r = x mod m.
1: q0 ← (x/bt),
2: r0 ← x− q0bt,
3: r ← r0,
4: i← 0,
5: while qi > 0 do
6: qi+1 ← (qic/bt),
7: ri+1 ← qic− qi+1bt,
8: i← i+ 1,
9: r ← r + ri.
10: end while
11: while r ≥ m do
12: r ← r −m.
13: end while
14: Return ((r)).
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